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This dissertation analyzes the economic, political, and social consequences of
labor market interventions by different economic actors. What happens when
consumers in the developed world intervene in the labor market of the devel-
oping world through boycott campaigns? How did a Temporary Workers Pro-
tection Act mandated by the Korean government shape the relations between
a temporary workers’ union and a regular workers’ union? Does increase in
minimum wages decrease household poverty? In this dissertation, we will see
that well-intended action may make the targeted individuals worse-off. We will
also see that in some cases such backlashes can lead to other opportunities.
The first chapter “Boycott Activism and Its Welfare Consequences” provides
a theoretical framework that can be used to analyze the overall effects of prod-
uct boycotts. Consumers have the power to change the behavior of the firm
through boycott campaigns. Their conscientious participation, however, may
actually result in a reduction in welfare of the workers if the firm decides to al-
ter its operation by lowering the wage expecting a demand decrease or by shut-
ting down and moving elsewhere. The analysis emphasizes the importance of
information, suggesting that activists set their goals by studying the labor mar-
ket and coordinating with local groups rather than demanding what may seem
righteous.
The second chapter “Solidarity or Competition? A Tale of Two Unions”
presents a case study of a coalition of two labor unions that led the 2007 Tempo-
rary Workers Movement against the government’s installment of a Temporary
Workers Protection Act in South Korea. One union consisted mainly of regu-
lar workers and the other mainly of temporary workers. I argue that political
opportunities combined with change in objectives with the progression of nego-
tiation shaped the processes of coalition formation and dissolution. Qualitative
and quantitative variance of resources, protest style, and membership charac-
teristics across organizations acted as an incentive for joining forces at first, but
hindered a common identity from forming and ultimately led to the breaking of
the coalition.
The third chapter “Poverty Effects of the Minimum Wage: The Role of
Household Employment Composition” (with Gary Fields and Ravi Kanbur)
provides an analytical framework to study the impact of minimum wages on
a class of absolute poverty measures. The effects of a minimum wage increase
depend on the values of key parameters (poverty line, poverty aversion, la-
bor demand elasticity, and the starting level of the minimum wage), which
demonstrates a need for a nuanced appreciation of poverty measures. More-
over, the relationship between poverty and the minimum wage is in general
non-monotonic, so that local effects may be different from the effects of large
changes in the minimum wage.
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CHAPTER 1
BOYCOTT ACTIVISM AND ITS WELFARE CONSEQUENCES
1.1 Introduction
The 1990s saw a surge of anti-sweatshop boycott campaigns against multina-
tional corporations.1 Activists demanded improvements in working conditions
- higher wage rates, shorter working hours - at the respective subcontracting
firms2 by threatening to refrain from making selected purchases (Friedman,
1985, p. 97) if their requests were not met.
I present a general equilibrium framework that links consumers, the firm,
and workers and analyze the welfare consequences of such boycott activism. I
argue that as the firm decides on the price and quantity of goods to produce
maximizing its profits given the minimum wage requests from the activists and
the estimated product demand, consumers and workers may become better or
worse off compared to the pre-boycott situation. The intuition is that when the
price of a product increases in response to the increase in wages, and when there
are many non-activists in the population who do not care about the welfare of
the workers in the first place, the consumers overall may be worse off due to
boycott campaigns. On the other hand, if product price decreases because of
the campaign, consumers will be unambiguously better-off. For the workers,
if the firm decides to ignore the threats and takes the hit of the demand shock
and eventually reduce production, then there will be less employment available.
Moreover, the firm may decide to move to a cheaper region so that even with
1For a review of the US’s campaign, refer to Elliott and Freeman (2001).
2100 percent of the goods sold by firms such as Nike and Reebok are manufactured in sub-
contracting firms all over the world.
1
the demand shock one may reap greater profits, or decide to move to a more
expensive but productive location where the wage is justified by the productiv-
ity (Brown et al., 2002, p. 12) which in both cases will result in unemployment
making the production workers worse off.3
There are some empirical evidence of firm exits: according to Kucera (2001)
cited by Brown et al. (2002), a 10% increase in wage share was associated with
a 6.6% to 8.5% decline in foreign direct investment inflows in the less devel-
oped countries, compared with a 4.3% to 5.8% decline for all countries. Har-
rison and Scorse (2006) have found that in Indonesia, from 1990 to 1996, the
anti-sweatshop activism resulted in more than 20% increase in real wages for
unskilled workers in large foreign-owned textiles, footwear, and apparel (TFA)
exporting plants relative to other TFA plants that were not exposed to activism.
They found a large increase in aggregate manufacturing unemployment, even
though there was not a significant additional impact to the employments of the
firms that were exposed to activism. Interestingly, foreign-owned TFA export-
ing plants were less likely to close down during those periods.
This is not the first paper to model boycotts. For example, Basu and
Zarghamee (2005) looks at how consumer product boycotts based on product
labelling may increase child labor: children are less desired by the firm which
will lower the wage and therefore forcing them to work more for the household
to reach subsistence level of income. Another paper that looks at how boycott
works is Baron (2002): he demonstrates how individuals may appear to coor-
3Unfortunately, sometimes the firm exits were not adverse side effects of a well-intended
action but were the goals themselves. As Moran (2002, p. 70) points out, there has been indi-
viduals who criticized the working conditions in developing countries in order to protect the
jobs in the developed world. By imposing higher standards in the low-productivity low-wage
locations they force the firms not to off-shore in such regions in the first place or to exit and
relocate back home, to the high-wage high-productivity region.
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dinate actions to boycott against a firm and explores why such actions occur
quickly for certain issues than others.
To the best of my knowledge, there has not been any work that looks at
overall welfare effects of boycott activism. When the existing boycott models
are essentially partial equilibrium frameworks that focus on either the labor side
or the consumption side, the general equilibrium setting provided in this paper
allows us to analyze the impact on boycotts to the overall society - consumers,
workers, the firm - so that one can work out the optimal minimum wage that
gives us the first-best outcome. This paper is also the first work that I know of
which explicitly models footloose firms: when will the firm exit and what can
the activists do to prevent it are some questions that I try to answer.
I have a three-period model that captures the dynamics between the boycott
activists and the firm. In period 1, firm decides between two possible regions of
production: a low productivity and low wage region, and a high productivity
and high wage region.4 In period 2, consumers obtain information about the
welfare of the workers that produce the goods they consume. The activists de-
clare a minimum wage level and threatens the firm: “If you, the firm, do not
raise the wage level to wˆ, we will reduce our consumption of the good.” In pe-
riod 3, seeing the proposed wage level, the firm decides between complying
and raising the wages, ignoring and retaining the wages, or exiting to a differ-
ent region where the minimum wage level does not have a bite. In this work,
I rule out the possibility of the firm opting out of the region to a lower wage
- lower productivity region than the current one: this is to make it consistent
with the firm’s decision in period 1. The firm may choose to move to a lower
4In reality, firm chooses subcontracting firms, and the subcontracting firm chooses regions
to produce the good. For now, let’s assume that subcontracting firm is a part of the firm that
makes zero profits, and the firms make the location decision.
3
wage - lower productivity region if it concludes that if it were going to ignore
the boycotts it may as well go to the cheapest region to minimize the losses from
the boycott demand shock.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. After presenting the model in
section 1.2, I analyze the equilibrium outcomes and discuss welfare implications
in section 1.3. Section 1.4 continues the discussion and use the implications of
the model in thinking about transnational activism. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 The Model
This section describes the basic structure of the model. Subsection 1.2.1 shows
the assumptions and structure behind the demand behavior and subsection
1.2.2, behind the supply behavior.
1.2.1 Demand
There are two types of consumers - Caring (C) and Neutral (N). The C types are
activists who care about the wage level of the workers that produce the goods
they consume. The N types, on the other hand, are neutral and do not care about
the wage level. Let us normalize the consumer population to 1 and suppose that
there are δ ∈ [0, 1] number of C type consumers and 1 − δ of N type ones.
Both types of individuals have I of wealth and choose between a numeraire
good x and a consumption good q. The price of a unit of the consumption good
is p. The C type gets satisfaction from consuming x, q, and from the fact that the
4
firm is treating its workers (who produce the good q that they consume) well.
The N type gets satisfaction only from consuming x and q.
The C type or the activists chooses q to maximize
max
qc
Uc(qc) = xc + f (qc) + αv(w; wˆ)(qc + 1) (1.1)
such that xc + pqc ≤ I. α is a constant that captures the extent to which the C type
cares for the welfare of the workers. For a greater α she cares more. Activist
has a reservation value - a minimum wage wˆ that she would like the workers
to earn working for the firm. This is the wage that she will demand of the firm
in the boycott campaign. The function v(w; wˆ) is an indicator function that takes
the value 0 or −1 depending on the relative size of w with respect to wˆ. That is,
v(w; wˆ) =

0, if w ≥ wˆ ;
−1, if w < wˆ.
Having quasi-linear preferences, the optimal consumption level of q is not af-
fected by the income level. This is to solely focus on the effects of the different
degrees of caring-ness of consumers rather than individual income differences
in comparing consumption schedules. Rewriting (1.1), activist’s maximization
problem becomes
max
qc
Uc(qc) = I − pqc + f (qc) + αv(w; wˆ)(qc + 1). (1.2)
To make the model more tractable so that we can derive a closed-form solution,
let’s assume f (qc) = Aqc−1/2q2c . (I assume that A ≥ q∗c in all cases so that the level
of optimal consumption will occur on the increasing part of the curve.) Having
specific functional forms enables us to conduct the welfare analysis in the up-
coming sections relatively easily. Maximization problem (1.2) now becomes
max
qc
Uc(qc) = I − pqc + Aqc − 1/2q2c + αv(w; wˆ)(qc + 1). (1.3)
5
When we solve for the above, activist’s optimal consumption of the good qc is
qc = A− p+αv(w), which can be thought of as the demand function of good q for
the C types. We focus only on the interior solutions. Note here that depending
on v(w; wˆ) we get a shift in the demand. Suppose the current wage rate w is
such that w < wˆ. Then the individual will be experiencing −α(q + 1) units of
disutility when it consumes q units of the good. Note that even when she does
not consume any of good q, the information that the workers are not paid well
enough - wˆ - causes her disutility of α.
The N type individual chooses qn to maximize
max
qn
Un(qn) = xn + f (qn) (1.4)
such that xn+ pqn ≤ I. Note here that the utility of the neutral type is not affected
by the wages of the workers that produce the good q.
Rewriting (1.4), N type’s maximization problem becomes
max
qn
Un(qn) = I − pqn + f (qn). (1.5)
Let’s assume that the N type gets the same satisfaction from q as the C types:
f (qn) = Aqn − 1/2q2n. Maximization problem (1.5) now becomes:
max
qn
Un(qn) = I − pqn + Aqn − 1/2q2n. (1.6)
When we solve for the above maximization problem, the N type’s optimal con-
sumption schedule of the good qn is qn = A − p, which is the demand function
of the good q for them. Note here that the demand only depends on the price of
the good p.
Since the indirect utility functions of both types follow the Gorman form,
we can sum the demands of all consumers to create an aggregate demand. Re-
6
call that there are δ number of type C consumers and 1 − δ number of type N
consumers. The social aggregate demand for the good q then is q = qc + qn =
δ(A − p + αv(w)) + (1 − δ)(A − p) = A − p + αδv(w). Note here that the aggregate
demand function is q = A − p if all consumers are of the N type that does not
care about the wage level at the production site. When all consumers are of the
C type, the aggregate demand is q = A − p + αv(w).
In a scenario with one representative consumer, δ can be interpreted as a
parameter that measures the extent to which the consumer is concerned with
the welfare of the workers. The amount of loss in utility, αδv(w)(q + 1), will take
the value 0 when the representative consumer is not concerned (δ = 0). As δ
increases, she will be negatively affected by the welfare of the workers more.
1.2.2 Supply
The firm is a monopolist, a single producer of the good. This is not an unreal-
istic assumption since as BdD (2005, p. 5) and others have noted, most of the
firms targeted by activists are big brand name retailers that are monopolists in a
sense.5 The firm is also a monopsonist in the labor market paying a higher wage
than the average local wage. Again, this assumption is justified by the empirical
evidence6 that multinational firms pay higher wages than the local firms.7
Figure 1.1 shows the labor supply function, marginal cost of labor, and
5Even when there are multiple producers of the good, as long as we assume Cournot
oligopolistic competition, the basic message still holds true.
6for a review, refer to Brown et al. (2002).
7In reality, it is not the Firm (or Nike) that decides on the wage level of the workers in the
production site but their respective subcontracting firms. And it is the subcontracting firms
that decide where to produce. If we assume that the subcontracting firm is making zero profits
because of the competition amongst them, it will be as if the firm owns the subcontracting firm.
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Figure 1.1: Labor Supply, Marginal Cost of Labor and Marginal Product of
Labor.
marginal product of labor for two regions of production denoted by h and l.
The h region has higher productivity and a corresponding high average local
wage wh when the l region has lower productivity with a corresponding low
average local wage wl.8 For the h region, the inverse labor supply function is
Wh(L) =

wh if L < L¯
;
L, if L ≥ L
¯
.
When the firm offers a wage less than the local average wage wh, no one is
willing to work for the firm. At the average local wage level wh, some fraction
of the population L
¯
will come to work. As the firm increases the wage beyond
wh, more people will want to work at the firm. For the l region, the inverse labor
8Basically I aggregate and represent the whole range of wages of the region into a single
value.
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supply function is characterized as
Wl(L) =

wl if L < L¯
;
L − k, if L ≥ L
¯
.
The shape of the supply curve has a similar story as that of the high wage region.
At the average local wage level wl, some fraction of the population L¯
will come
to work. As the firm increases the wage beyond wl, more people will want to
work at the firm. Note here that k basically measures the difference between the
average local wages of the high region h and the low region l. Here I have set
the fraction of number of workers that will come to work at local average wages
as L
¯
for both regions. The analysis continues to hold for different values of L
¯
.
The production function of the h region is
gh(L) = aL,
a linear technology where a ≥ 1. For the l region,
gl(L) = L.
The region h has higher productivity than region l and a captures the relative
productivity difference.
In period 1 there is no information about the wages at production sites and
therefore all individuals are essentially neutral: δ = 0. Firm decides between
two possible regions of production: a low productivity - low wage region, or a
high productivity - high wage region taking into account the demand q = A − p
schedule. When the firm produces in h, its maximization problem will be
max
L
pih(L) =p(gh(L))gh(L) − wh(L)L
= (A − aL)(aL) − L2. (1.7)
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When the firm produces in l, the maximization problem will be
max
L
pil(L) =p(gl(L))gl(L) − wl(L)L
= (A − L)(L) − (L − k)L. (1.8)
Here, we ignore the range of L where L < L
¯
for both regions because multi-
national firms do pay higher wages than the local firms (Brown et al., 2002,
p. 13). Solving for equations (1.7) and (1.8) and maximizing profits, the opti-
mal amounts of employment can be calculated: L∗h =
Aa
2a2 + 2
for h and L∗l =
A + k
4
for l.
Proposition 1.1 Greater employment is generated if the firm operates in the low pro-
ductivity region.
Proof is in the appendix. The aggregate demand schedule q = A − p is the same
regardless of the production region during this stage. For the same amount of
production and sales, the firm will have to hire more people in region l than
h because workers in h has better skills or better infrastructure. Cheaper labor
costs also induces the firm to hire more workers in l.
The firm’s respective profits for producing in h and l are pih(L∗h) =
A2a2
4a2 + 4
and pil(L∗l ) =
(A + k)2
8
, which are depicted as the shaded areas in Figure 1.2. The
corresponding equilibrium wage levels at each region are w∗h =
Aa
2a2 + 2
and w∗l =
A − 3k
4
. (We assume A/3 ≥ k to focus on interior solutions.) The prices charged
to the consumer are ph =
A(a2 + 2)
2a2 + 2
and pl =
3A − k
4
if the good is produced in h
or l, respectively. Note here that LDl and LDh are derived demand functions of
labor when pl and ph are corresponding equilibrium prices of the goods.
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Figure 1.2: Profits for regions l and h.
Proposition 1.2 There exists a cut-off for the wage difference k¯(a) = A(
√
2a2
a2 + 1
− 1)
such that for k ≤ k¯(a), the firm yields greater profits when it operates in region h than
in region l. The cut-off k¯(a) increases as the relative productivity a of region h increases.
Proof is in the appendix. If the local average wage difference between the two
region is small enough, there is not much benefit in producing in l compared
to h. As the relative productivity of region h increases, however, even if the
local average wage in region l is lower by k, it will be profitable for the firm to
produce in h.
Let’s suppose k¯(a) < k: the l region has a local average wage low enough that
the expected profit of producing there is greater than the expected profit of pro-
ducing in region h. Then the firm will choose l over h for the initial production.
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It will employ L∗l =
A + k
4
workers and pay them the wage of w∗l =
A − 3k
4
, charge
the unit price pl =
3A − k
4
to the consumers and yield a profit of pil(L∗l ) =
(A + k)2
8
.
Let’s assume here that the reservation wage that the Caring type has or will be
demanding of is greater than or equal to the equilibrium wage in l and less than
or equal to the equilibrium wage in h: w∗l ≤ wˆ ≤ w∗h. For these inequalities to be
true, a and k have to satisfy
A(a − 1)2
3(a2 + 1)
≤ k, or A(a − 1)
2
3(a2 + 1)
≤ k ≤ A
3
combining with
the assumption for k we have applied before.
Consumers obtain information about the welfare of the workers that pro-
duce the goods they consume. When the C type consumers learn about the
wage level w∗l paid by the firm in region l, they experience disutility. When the
N type consumers learn about the wage level w∗l in region l, they are neutral
and the information does not affect them. Therefore only the C type will be-
come activists and will threaten the firm with a reservation wage level wˆ: “if
you, the firm, do not raise the wages to wˆ each of us will reduce consumption of
the good by α, which will arise to a αδ decrease of the overall social demand of
the good.” For the rest of the analysis, let’s set α = 1 for simplification. Then we
are assuming that with δ caring individuals faced with the wage level w∗l , there
will be a δ reduction in demand in the case of a boycott. Now the firm has three
options. It can either 1) Comply and raise the wage to wˆ and continue producing
in l, 2) Ignore and continue producing in l, or 3) shut down the factories in l and
Move to the h region where the announced minimum wage level does not have
a bite. We calculate the respective payoffs for each scenario.
1) Comply
Suppose the firm Complies. It increases the wages and continues producing
in l. Then the demand it will face will be q = A − p. There are two different
12
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Figure 1.3: Two Cases of Comply.
profit maximizations possible depending on the size of wˆ. This is drawn in
Figure 1.3. The left hand side case (Comply (1)) is where the demanded wage wˆ
is low enough so that all individuals who are willing to work at that wage are
employed. The right hand side case (Comply (2)) is when wˆ is too high for the
firm to employ all the individuals who are willing to work at that wage level.
The cutoff value of w that divides the two cases is the intersection of the labor
supply function and the marginal product of labor9: w
¯
=
A − 2k
3
. That is, if
wˆ ≤ w
¯
, then we are in Comply (1). On the other hand, if wˆ ≥ w
¯
, then we are in
Comply (2). We also impose a condition for k and a:
A
2
− 3Aa
4(a2 + 1)
≤ k so that
w
¯
≤ w∗h.
9MPL = A − 2L and the labor supply function is w = L − k. Equating w and MPL, we get
w
¯
=
A − 2k
3
.
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For Comply (1), the optimal labor Lc1 and thus the profit pic1 are determined
as soon as wˆ is set. From the labor supply function w = L − k, we get Lc1 = wˆ + k.
The profit is
pic1(Lc1) = p(gl(Lc1))gl(Lc1) − wˆLc1
= (A − (wˆ + k))(wˆ + k) − (wˆ + k)wˆ
= (A − 2wˆ − k))(wˆ + k). (1.9)
The price of the good is pc1 = A−Lc1 = A−wˆ−k. Again, this is for wˆ ≤ w¯ only. For
Comply (2), The profit maximization problem the firm faces in region l paying
wˆ is
max
L
pic2(Lc2) = p(gl(Lc2))gl(Lc2) − wˆLc2
= (A − Lc2)(Lc2) − Lc2wˆ. (1.10)
When wˆ ≥ w
¯
, the employment that maximizes the profit is Lc2 =
A − wˆ
2
. The
respective profit is pic2 =
(A − wˆ)2
4
and the price charged to the consumers is
pc =
A + wˆ
2
.
The shaded areas in Figure 1.3 are the respective profits. Note here that for
all Lc1 = Lc2, pic1 > pic2. Let’s suppose for wage demands wˆ and wˆ′, wˆ ≤ w¯ ≤ wˆ
′.
The firm’s profit maximizing employments are the same for both cases as L. The
firm will be making less profits when it is forced to pay wˆ′ rather than wˆ. This
seemingly obvious observation will be useful when we analyze the behavior of
the firm later on. We can write the profits of the two comply functions into one:
pic(wˆ) =

(A − 2wˆ − k))(wˆ + k), if wˆ ≤ w
¯
;
(A − wˆ)2
4
, if wˆ ≥ w
¯
.
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Proposition 1.3 The profit of the firm pic(wˆ) is maximized when wˆ = w∗l . As wˆ in-
creases from w∗l , the firm’s profit decreases.
Proposition 1.4 As wˆ increases from w∗l , social welfare or the total surplus increases
and is maximized when wˆ = w
¯
. As wˆ increases further, the total surplus decreases.
Proofs are the appendix. Looking at Figure 1.3, we see that the total surplus
is the area ACEGQ which will be maximized at wˆ = w
¯
. In Figure 1.4, we can
depict the profits and social welfare for the Comply case with increasing wˆ.
2) Ignore
Suppose the firm Ignores the boycott threat, refuses to increase the wages
and continues producing in l. Then the demand it faces is q = A − p − δ because
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the C type consumers would have boycotted. The profit maximization problem
of the firm producing in l now becomes:
max
L
pil(L) =p(gl(L))gl(L) − w(L)L
= (A − δ − L)(L) − L(L − k). (1.11)
The employment that maximizes the profit is Li =
A − δ + k
4
which is lower than
the employment rate before the threat L∗l =
A + k
4
. The respective profit now
becomes pii =
(A − δ + k)2
8
. Note here that the equilibrium wage is wi(Li) =
A − δ − 3k
4
, which is even lower than the wage level before the boycott threat
w∗l =
A − 3k
4
. This is the boycott backlash where because of activism, less work-
ers are employed at a lower wage rate. Price charged to the consumers now
becomes pi =
3(A − δ) − k
4
.
3) Move
Suppose the firm exits from the l region and Move to h. Then the demand
function the firm will face will be q = A − p since the activist’s reservation wage
wˆ would be lower than the equilibrium wage w∗h.
10 The profit maximization
problem (1.7) solved previously applies here. The optimal employment for
the high region is L∗h =
Aa
2a2 + 2
and the firm’s profits then becomes pi∗h(L
∗
h) =
A2a2
4a2 + 4
. The corresponding wage level is w∗h =
Aa
2a2 + 2
and the price charged
to the consumers is p∗h =
A(a2 + 2)
2a2 + 2
. Note here that the workers in the l region
is back to receiving the average local wage of wl. They have become worse off
because of the boycott campaign.
10How realistic is it to assume that the activists only care for wages that the producers pay,
and not the overall well-being of the workers in the low wage region? This assumption is not too
far-fetched since consumers do not care about the working environments of any poor country.
They are bothered by the fact that a multinational firm “exploits” cheap labor and they end up
consuming such blood-tainted products.
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1.3 Analysis
This section combines and analyzes the results presented in the previous sec-
tion. Subsection 1.3.1 discusses the decisions of the firm depending on different
parameter values. Subsection 1.3.2 analyzes the welfare consequences of each
decision, and subsection 1.3.3 demonstrates it with a specific example. Subsec-
tion 1.3.4 gives a simplified model for a situation when there is no technological
difference across regions and subsection 1.3.5 demonstrates it with an example.
1.3.1 Decision Making
Let us analyze the three possible outcomes. By assumption, the firm chooses
region l over h for initial production (pi∗l > pi
∗
h) which leads us to a condition for
k and a: k ≥ A(
√
2a√
a2 + 1
− 1). We have also assumed that w
¯
≤ w∗h, which gives us
(A − 2k)
3
≤ A
4
, or A ≤ 8k. Now, w∗l is known and the C type consumers demand a
minimum wage of wˆ for the workers. What will be the firm’s response?
Let’s divide the cases into two: pih ≤ pii and pii ≤ pih. When pih ≤ pii, it is
more profitable for the firm to Ignore than to Move, and when pii ≤ pih, it is more
profitable for the firm to Move than to Ignore.
Proposition 1.5 If δ ≤ δ˜, where δ˜ = k− k¯(a) = k−A(
√
2a2
a2 + 1
−1), it is more profitable
for the firm to Ignore than to Move. If δ ≥ δ˜, it is more profitable for the firm to Move
than to Ignore. δ˜ increases as k increases and a decreases .
The proof is in the appendix. The proposition states that when the number of
Caring individuals becomes too large, the size of the demand cut is too big for
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the firm to bear and the firm will choose to relocate to h. As a > 1 increases, the
maximum number of caring people whose demand the firm chooses to ignore,
δ˜, will go down. In other words, the firm will move to h if the productivity of
the h region goes up, all other things equal, when there is a protest. Similarly,
if wage difference between the two regions increases, the firm is more likely to
stay and ignore in region l because of the cheaper wage. Another thing to note
here is that δ˜ may be positive or negative depending on the relative sizes of a
and k. What happens when δ˜ < 0? Since by assumption δ ∈ [0, 1], we have δ ≥ δ˜
and the firm will always Move.
Suppose δ ≤ δ˜. If given a choice between Ignore and Move, the firm will
Ignore (pih ≤ pii). We can now focus on the decision between Comply and Move.
Proposition 1.6 When δ ≤ min[δ¯, δ˜], there exists a unique cut-off w∗ ∈ [w∗l ,w∗h] for wˆ
such that if wˆ ≤ w∗, the firm Complies. When wˆ ≥ w∗ the firm Ignores.
Here, δ¯ = (1 − √2(1 − a
2(a2 + 1)
))A + k. The proof using the Intermediate Value
Theorem is in the appendix. Suppose δ ≤ min[δ¯, δ˜] and there exists a unique cut-
off wˆ that divides the firm’s action between Comply and Ignore. One can solve
for wˆ for two scenarios: the first scenario is when the profit for Ignore satisfies
the inequality pii ≥ pic(w¯ ) and w
∗ ≤ w
¯
. The second scenario is when the profit
of Ignore satisfies the inequality pii ≥ pic(w¯ ) and w
∗ ≥ w
¯
. For each scenario, there
exists a cut-off wˆ beyond which the firm ignores and takes the demand hit rather
than complies.
Scenario 1. (pih ≤ pii, pic(w¯ ) ≤ pii
Proposition 1.7 When δ satisfies δ ≤ min[δ˜, (1−2
√
2
3
)(A+k)], there will exist a unique
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w¯ ≤ w
¯
such that for wˆ satisfying wˆ ≤ w¯ the firm will Comply. For wˆ ≥ w¯ the firm will
Ignore.
Here, if we write out w¯, it is w¯ =
A − 3k
4
+
√
δ(2A + 2k − δ)
4
. Note here that the
condition δ ≤ δ¯ that guarantees the existence of a cut-off is dropped. This is
because (1− 2
√
2
3
)(A+ k) ≤ δ¯.11 Proof for the proposition is in the appendix. This
result is intuitive: for lower wˆ, firm will comply. For higher wˆ, since the firm will
be suffering too much loss if it complies, it will ignore the demand.
Proposition 1.8 w¯ decreases with increasing k and decreasing δ.
Proof is in the appendix. Lowering of the the average local wage for l (i.e.,
increasing k) has the same effect as a higher wage demand wˆ: firms are more
likely to ignore so w¯ decreases. Increasing number of caring individuals mean
that if you ignore, you will be suffering more losses. So one is more likely to
comply and therefore w¯ increases. Figure 1.5 depicts this.
Scenario 2. pih ≤ pii ≤ pic(w¯ )
Proposition 1.9 When δ satisfies δ ≤ min[δ¯, δ˜] and δ ≥ (1 − 2
√
2
3
)(A + k), there will
exist a unique w˜ ≥ w
¯
such that for wˆ satisfying wˆ ≥ w˜ the firm will comply. For wˆ ≤ w˜
the firm will Ignore.
Note here that w˜ =
(
√
2 − 1)A + δ − k√
2
and is greater than w
¯
. Proof of this propo-
sition is in the appendix. Intuitively, for a lower wˆ the firm will comply. For a
higher wˆ the firm will ignore. One thing to note here is that depending on the
11For δ that satisfies δ ≤ (1 − 2
√
2
3
)(A + k) (which corresponds to pii ≥ pic(w¯ )) with A, k, and a
that satisfy
(A − 2k)
3
≥ Aa
2(a2 + 1)
(which corresponds to w
¯
≥ w∗h), we have δ ≤ δ¯.
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Figure 1.5: Changes in Wages in l in Scenario 1.
values of k, A, and a there may be no δ that can satisfy both δ ≤ min[δ¯, δ˜] and
δ ≥ (1 − 2
√
2
3
)(A + k) and gives us pih ≤ pii ≤ pic(w¯ ).
Proposition 1.10 w˜ decreases as k increases and δ decreases.
Proof is in the appendix. Lowering of the the average local wage for l (i.e.,
increasing k) firms are more likely to ignore because the lower wage becomes
an incentive: the cut-off w˜ decreases. When there are many caring individuals,
the firm is more likely to Comply for higher wˆ because the negative demand
shock of the boycott campaign is expected to be great. We can draw the actual
wage of region l with respect to wˆ in Figure 1.6. If δ¯ ≤ δ ≤ δ˜, then the firm will
Comply for all wˆ ∈ [w∗l ,w∗h]. If δ˜ ≤ δ¯ and δ˜ ≤ δ ≤ δ¯, then the firm will either
comply or move for all wˆ ∈ [w∗l ,w∗h].
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Figure 1.6: Changes in Wages in l in Scenario 2.
That is, suppose δ ≥ δ˜. If given a choice between Ignore and Move, the
firm will Move (pii ≤ pih). Under this assumption, we can focus on the decision
between Comply and Move.
Proposition 1.11 When δ satisfies δ ≥ δ˜ and −4a3 + 5a2 − 4a + 4 ≤ 0, there exists a
unique cutoff w∗ ∈ [w∗l ,w∗h] for wˆ such that if wˆ ≤ w∗, the firm Complies. When wˆ ≥ w∗,
the firm Moves.
Suppose δ ≥ δ˜ and −4a3 + 5a2 − 4a + 4 ≤ 0, and we know there exists a unique
cut-off wˆ that divides the firm’s action between Comply and Move. One can
solve for the cut-off wˆ for two scenarios: scenario 3 is when the profit for Move
satisfies the inequality pih ≥ pic(w¯ ) and w
∗ thus satisfies w∗ ≤ w
¯
. Scenario 4 is
when the profit of Move satisfies the inequality pih ≤ pic(w¯ ) and thus w
∗ ≥ w
¯
. For
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each scenario, there exists a cut-off wˆ beyond which the firm will Move rather
than Comply.
Scenario 3. pii ≤ pih, pih ≥ pic(w¯ )
Proposition 1.12 When δ satisfies δ ≥ δ˜ and k satisfies k ≤ A( 3a
2
√
a2 + 1
− 1), there
will exist a wˇ < w
¯
such that for wˆ satisfying wˆ ≤ wˇ the firm will Comply. For wˆ ≥ wˇ
the firm will Move.
Proof is in the appendix. Here wˇ =
A − 3k
4
+
√
(A + k)2
16
− a
2A2
8(a2 + 1)
. The condition
for k corresponds to the restriction that pih ≥ pic(w¯ ).
12 For lower wˆ the firm will
comply. For higher wˆ, the firm will move.
Proposition 1.13 wˇ increases with k increasing and a decreasing.
Proof is in the appendix. As productivity of h region a decreases, firm is less
likely to move out from l, so the cut-off wˇ increases. As the wage gap k increases,
it is more profitable to stay in region l so the cut-off wˇ increases as well. Figure
1.7 depicts the change in wages in region l.
Scenario 4. pii ≤ pih, pih ≤ pic(w¯ )
Proposition 1.14 When δ satisfies δ ≥ δ˜, k satisfies k ≥ A( 3a
2
√
a2 + 1
− 1), and a
satisfies −4a3 + 5a2 − 4a + 4 ≤ 0, there will exist a w˙ > w
¯
such that for wˆ ≤ w˙ the firm
will Comply. For wˆ satisfying wˆ ≥ w˙, the firm will Move .
12Again, the −4a3 + 5a2 − 4a + 4 ≤ 0 condition is dropped from the proposition because it will
be guaranteed when the k condition is satisfied.
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Figure 1.7: Changes in Wages in l in Scenario 3.
Note here that w˙ = A(1 − a√
a2 + 1
). Proof is in the appendix. If the wage de-
manded by the boycotters is too high, the firm could yield a higher profit mov-
ing out of region l to h rather than staying in l and complying.
Proposition 1.15 w˙ increases as a decreases.
Proof is in the appendix. As the relative productivity of workers in region h
compared to that in region l decreases, the minimum wage cut-off that will make
the firm to relocate will go up. Suppose the productivity difference is close to
zero. Then moving to the other region may not increase the firm’s profit that
much - so the wage increase that the firm is willing to bear instead of moving
out to h will go up. We can draw the actual wage of region l with respect to
wˆ in Figure 1.8. Finally, when δ ≥ δ˜ and −4a3 + 5a2 − 4a + 4 ≥ 0, we have
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Figure 1.8: Changes in Wages in l in Scenario 4.
pic(w∗h) ≥ pih(w∗h). Then for all w∗ ∈ [w∗l ,w∗h], the firm will always comply. In
sum, given an announced wˆ, we can predict how firms behave looking at the
parameters δ, k, and a.
1.3.2 Welfare Analysis
One can estimate the welfare effects to the consumers, workers, and the firm
from the product boycott for each scenario described in the previous section.
We can also look at the first best outcomes with regards to social welfare.
Scenario 1: firm Complies for a low wˆ ≤ w¯, Ignores for a high wˆ ≥ w¯ (δ˜ ≥ δ,
wˆ ≤ w
¯
)
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Figure 1.9: Comparison Between Comply and Ignore for Scenario 1.
Let’s study the marginal cost and product of labor graph in Figure 1.9. Since
the firm is a monopolist and a monopsonist, there is a social welfare loss when
the firm is maximizing its profits in region l. The area BDF is the dead weight
loss. Note here that when wˆ has a bite and the firm complies, the deadweight
loss decreases with increasing wˆ. Suppose the minimum wage is at the level
EH. Then the deadweight loss becomes the area CDE, which is smaller than
BDF. The consumer surplus ACO increases with increasing wˆ, and the worker’s
surplus EGSH increases as well.
Boycott activism can attain the maximum total surplus when wˆ = w¯. This is
because we know that Li < L∗l and therefore the total surplus of the Ignore case
in scenario 1, IJMTS, is less than the total surplus ABFGS when the firm is profit
maximizing. We compare the workers’ surplus, consumers’ surplus and firm’s
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surplus (profit) at wˆ = w¯ between Comply and Ignore. First of all, we know
that the workers’ surplus before the boycott threat, FQGS, is greater than the
workers’ surplus when the firm ignores, NSTM. The two trapezoids FQGS and
NSTM are similar, and with the distance FQ ( L∗l ) longer than the distance NM
(Li), we know that FQGS (w∗l ) > NSTM(wi). We also know that FQGS (wˆ = w¯) >
FQGS (w∗l ), which implies FQGS (wˆ = w¯) > NSTM(wi). For the firm, the profit
will be equal for Comply and Ignore at wˆ = w¯. For consumer surplus, we com-
pare the triangles ABR and IJO which are also similar. With the same logic as the
workers’ surplus case, we can see that ABR(wˆ = w¯) > ABR(w∗l ) > IJO(wi). There-
fore, the total surplus which is the summation of consumer surplus, producer
surplus, and workers’ surplus, we see that the total surplus of producing at l
without the boycott threat ABFGS (w∗l ) is greater than the Ignore case IS TMJ(wi)
and since ABFGS (wˆ) increases as wˆ increases, we see that the total welfare is
maximized at wˆ = w¯.
Scenario 2: firm complies for low wˆ ≤ w˜, Ignores for high wˆ ≥ w˜. (δ˜ ≥ δ,
wˆ ≥ w
¯
)
Looking at Figure 1.10, one sees that at wˆ = w
¯
, the firm can achieve the max-
imum profit by complying. This is because the area that represents the profit,
BUQV, decreases as wˆ increases from w
¯
. (You can see this by looking at how the
lengths BU and UQ shorten as wˆ increases.) Suppose the minimum wage wˆ is at
the level EH and wˆ ≥ w
¯
. Then the deadweight loss becomes the area CDF, which
is greater than BDU at wˆ = w
¯
. As wˆ increases from w
¯
, consumer surplus ACR
decreases. The changes in workers’ surplus is ambiguous because even though
the wage of the employed goes up, the overall employment goes down as wˆ
increases. If we look at the total surplus, ACFGS, with respect to changes in wˆ,
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Figure 1.10: Comparison Between Comply and Ignore for Scenario 2.
we can see that it decreases as wˆ increases. Thus the total surplus is maximized
when wˆ = w
¯
. Let’s now compare this with the total surplus maximization in the
Ignore case. Again, we know that Li < L∗l , and therefore the total surplus of the
Ignore case, IJST, is less than the total surplus when the firm is profit maximiz-
ing (the same logic used in the analysis of scenario 1 applies here). The profit
maximizing total surplus is less than the total surplus at wˆ = w
¯
. Therefore the
total surplus maximizing wˆ is w
¯
.
That is, by announcing w
¯
, not only are you raising the wages of the work-
ers and maximizing the workers’ surplus, consumer surplus is maximized and
firm’s profit is maximized (within scenario 2). Overall, the total surplus is max-
imized.13
13One thing to note here is that there will not be a situation where the deadweight loss be-
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Figure 1.11: Comparison between Comply and Move for Scenario 3.
Scenario 3: firm Complies for a low wˆ ≤ wˇ, Moves for a high wˆ ≥ wˇ (δ˜ ≤ δ,
wˆ ≤ w
¯
)
In Figure 1.11, the area BDF is the dead weight loss. Note here that when wˆ
has a bite and the firm complies, the deadweight loss decreases. Suppose the
minimum wage is at the level EH. Then the deadweight loss becomes the area
CDE, which is smaller than BDF. That is, as wˆ increases, the deadweight loss
decreases and the total surplus increases. This is a combination of the consumer
surplus ACO increasing, worker’s surplus EGSH increasing, and profit CEOH
decreasing with increasing wˆ.
comes zero. This is because even if the wˆ is set to the point where labor supply meets labor
demand, there will not be full employment but only upto the point where the marginal product
of labor curve meets the wˆ.
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What is the maximum total surplus the boycott activism can attain? This
scenario is a bit tricky because We do not know whether the profit maximizing
total surplus in h is less than the profit maximizing total surplus in l. The relative
sizes will depend on a and k.
Suppose AaJKMN, the profit maximizing total surplus in region h, (de-
noted by TS h) is greater than the profit maximizing total surplus of region l,
ABFGS (w∗l ) (denoted by TS l). This is due to the possible surplus for consumers:
even though profit maximizing profit in region l is greater than that of region h
and profit maximizing workers’ surplus of l is greater than that of h, if consumer
surplus of producing in h is great enough to make up for the loss in firm’s and
worker’s surplus, it will be better for the overall society to produce in h. Then as
wˆ increases, TS l increases. When wˆ reaches wˇ, the firm will move to h but we still
do not know for sure whether TS l(wˇ) is greater or less than TS h. On the other
hand, when TS h < TS l(w∗l ), then the maximum total surplus in this scenario is
reaped when the firm complies to the wage demand wˆ = wˇ.
Scenario 4: firm Complies for low wˆ ≤ w˙, Moves for a high wˆ ≥ w˙ (δ˜ ≤ δ,
wˆ ≥ w
¯
)
In Figure 1.12, the firm can achieve the maximum profit at wˆ = w
¯
in region
l. Suppose the minimum wage wˆ is at the level EH and wˆ ≥ w
¯
. Then the dead-
weight loss becomes the area CDF, which is greater than BDU when wˆ = w
¯
.
As wˆ increases from w
¯
, deadweight loss increases and consumer surplus ACR
decreases. The changes in workers’ surplus is ambiguous because even though
the wage of the employed goes up, the overall employment goes down with in-
creasing wˆ. When the firm complies, the total surplus maximization will occur
at wˆ = w
¯
, similar to scenario 2.
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Figure 1.12: Comparison between Comply and Move for Scenario 4.
What is the maximum total surplus that the boycott activism can gener-
ate? Suppose AaJKMN, the profit maximizing total surplus of region h, TS h,
is greater than the profit maximizing total surplus of region l, TS l. As wˆ in-
creases from w
¯
the total surplus decreases. At w˙, the firm will move out to h.
Here TS l(w˙) may or may not be greater than TS h. This will depend on the rel-
ative sizes of a and k. On the other hand, suppose TS h < TS l(w∗l ). Then the
maximum total surplus in this scenario is generated when the firm complies to
the wage demand wˆ = w
¯
. As wˆ increases from w
¯
, total surplus goes down.
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1.3.3 Analysis when a = 1.3, A = 2, k = 1/3
Now we go over an example when a = 1.3, A = 2, k = 1/3 (note here that this
satisfies
(A − 2k)
3
≤ A
4
, or A ≤ 8k) and predict the behavior of the firm with
respect to δ. The two regions have different productivities and different local
average wage levels specified as wh = wl + 1/3.
Solving the maximization problems of each region, the optimal amounts of
employment are L∗h =
Aa
2a2 + 2
= 0.483 and L∗l =
A + k
4
=
2 + 1/3
4
= 0.583. The
firm’s respective profits will be pih(L∗h) =
A2a2
4a2 + 4
= 0.628 and pil(L∗l ) =
(A + k)2
8
=
0.681. The corresponding wage level in each region is w∗h =
Aa
2a2 + 2
= 0.483 and
w∗l =
A − 3k
4
= 0.25.
The price charged to the consumer if the good is produced in h is ph =
A(a2 + 2)
2a2 + 2
= 1.372 and if produced in l, pl =
3A − k
4
= 1.417. Since the low wage
region yields greater profits than the high wage region, the firm will always ini-
tially produce in l, paying wage of w∗l =
1
4
and setting the price at pl = 1.417.
Note here that w
¯
=
A − 2k
3
= 0.444.
The w∗l =
1
4
is known and the C type consumers demand wˆ ∈ [0.25, 0.483] for
the workers. What will be the firm’s response? Let’s first calculate the values δ˜
and δ¯, plugging in a = 1.3, A = 2, k = 1/3: δ˜ = k− k¯(a) = 1/3−2(
√
2(1.3)2
(1.3)2 + 1
−1) =
0.091 and δ¯ = (1 − √2(1 − a
2(a2 + 1)
))A + k = 0.344. Note here that δ˜ < δ¯. From
Proposition 1.5, if δ ≤ 0.091, it is more profitable for the firm to Ignore than to
Move. If δ ≥ 0.091, it is more profitable for the firm to Move than to Ignore.
Suppose δ ≤ 0.091. If given a choice between Ignore and Move, the firm will
Ignore. We can now focus on the decision between Comply and Move. From
31
Proposition 1.6, we know that when δ ≤ 0.091, there exists a unique cut-off
w∗ ∈ [w∗l ,w∗h] for wˆ such that if wˆ ≤ w∗, the firm Complies. When wˆ ≥ w∗ the firm
Ignores.
From Proposition 1.7, when δ satisfies δ ≤ min[δ˜, (1− 2
√
2
3
)(A+k)], there exists
a unique w¯ ≤ w
¯
such that for wˆ satisfying wˆ ≤ w¯ the firm will Comply. For wˆ ≥ w¯
the firm will Ignore. Since (1 − 2
√
2
3
)(A + k) = 0.1334, min[δ˜, (1 − 2
√
2
3
)(A + k)] =
0.091.
When δ ≤ 0.091, there will exist a unique w¯ ≤ w
¯
such that for wˆ satisfying
wˆ ≤ w¯ the firm will Comply. For wˆ ≥ w¯ the firm will Ignore.
When δ ≥ 0.091, if given a choice between Ignore and Move, the firm will
Move. Under this assumption, we can focus on the decision between Comply
and Move.
From Proposition 1.11, when δ satisfies δ ≥ 0.091 and −4a3 + 5a2 − 4a + 4 ≤ 0
(which is satisfied for a = 1.3), there exists a unique cut-off w∗ ∈ [w∗l ,w∗h] for wˆ
such that if wˆ ≤ w∗, the firm Complies. When wˆ ≥ w∗, the firm Moves.
From Proposition 1.12, when δ satisfies δ ≥ 0.091 there will exist a wˇ < w
¯
such that for wˆ satisfying wˆ ≤ wˇ the firm will Comply. For wˆ ≥ wˇ the firm will
Move. This is because for the values a = 1.3, A = 2, and k = 1/3, k satisfies
k ≤ A( 3a
2
√
a2 + 1
− 1).)
To sum up the above results: for δ ≤ 0.091, there exists a unique w¯ ≤ w
¯
such
that for wˆ satisfying wˆ ≤ w¯ the firm will Comply. For wˆ ≥ w¯ the firm will Ignore.
(This corresponds to scenario 1.) Total welfare is maximized at wˆ = w¯.
For δ satisfying 0.091 ≤ δ, there exists a wˇ < w
¯
such that for wˆ satisfying
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wˆ ≤ wˇ the firm will Comply. For wˆ ≥ wˇ the firm will Move. (This corresponds to
scenario 3.) Total welfare is maximized at wˆ = wˇ. (The total surplus when pro-
ducing in l is greater than the total surplus producing in h at the initial decision
making stage.)
1.3.4 Analysis when a = 1
For expositional purposes, we do two exercises: the current subsection will
solve for the case when a = 1. The next subsection will solve for a more specific
case where a = 1, A = 2, k = 1/3.
When we set a = 1, it means that there are two regions of production denoted
by h and l with the same productivity but different local average wage levels,
where wh = wl + k. Where will the firm initially produce before boycotts? The
optimal amounts of employment are: for the high region, L∗h =
A
4
, and for the
low region, L∗l =
A + k
4
. If the firm operates at the low wage region it will be
generating more employment than when it operates in the high wage region.
The firm’s respective profits become pih(L∗h) =
A2
8
and pil(L∗l ) =
(A + k)2
8
, de-
picted by the shaded areas in Figure 1.13. The corresponding wage level at each
region will be w∗h =
A
4
, and w∗l =
A − 3k
4
. The price charged to the consumer if
firm produces in h is ph =
A(3)
4
and in l, pl =
3A − k
4
. The low wage region yields
greater profits than the high wage region for all k ≥ 0. The firm will always ini-
tially produce at l, paying the wage w∗l =
A − 3k
4
and setting price at pl =
3A − k
4
.
Moreover, for all 0 ≤ k ≤ A
3
, we are guaranteed w∗l ≤ w∗h.14
14This comes from plugging in a = 1 to
A(a − 1)2
3(a2 + 1)
≤ k, a condition for k which guarantees
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Figure 1.13: Two Regions with the Same Productivity.
Faced with a product boycott, the firm has three options. 1) Comply and raise
the wage to wˆ and continue producing in l, 2) Ignore and continue producing in l,
or 3) Move the production to the h region where the announced minimum wage
level does not have a bite. We calculate the respective payoffs for the three cases.
Let us analyze the three possible outcomes. The firm chose region l over h
for initial production for all wage level difference k. The w∗l is known and the C
type consumers demand wˆ for the workers. What will be the firm’s response?
Applying a = 1 to Proposition 1.5 so that we can get the conditions of which
the firm prefers Ignore to Move, we get δ˜ = k. That is, when there is no produc-
tivity difference between the two regions h and l, if δ satisfies δ ≤ k, it is more
w∗l ≤ w∗h. We also assumed that w¯ ≤ w
∗
h, which gives us
(A − 2k)
3
≤ A
4
or A ≤ 8k.
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profitable for the firm to Ignore than to Move. In other words, if the number
of Caring individuals becomes greater than k, the size of the demand cut is too
large for the firm to bear and it will choose to relocate to h rather than to ignore.
Suppose now that δ satisfies δ ≤ k. When will the firm Comply and when
will it Ignore the threat? Rewriting δ¯ with a = 1, we get δ¯ =
A(4 − 3√2)
4
+ k,
which is less than δ˜ = k. According to Proposition 1.6, when δ ≤ A(4 − 3
√
2)
4
+ k,
there will exist a unique cutoff w∗ ∈ [w∗l ,w∗h] for wˆ such that if wˆ ≤ w∗, the firm
Complies. When wˆ ≥ w∗ the firm Ignores.
Suppose δ ≤ A(4 − 3
√
2)
4
+ k and we know there exists a unique cut-off wˆ
that divides the firm’s action between Comply and Ignore. One can solve for
wˆ for two scenarios: the first scenario is when the profit of Ignore satisfies the
inequality pii ≥ pic(w¯ ) and w
∗ ≤ w
¯
. The second scenario is when the profit
of Ignore satisfies the inequality pii ≤ pic(w¯ ) and w
∗ ≥ w
¯
. For each scenario,
there exists a cut-off wˆ beyond which the firm will ignore and take the demand
hit rather than comply. Let’s see how applying a = 1 simplifies our results
presented in the previous subsection.
Applying a = 1 to Proposition 1.7, we get a condition for δ that will give
us a unique cut-off: when δ satisfies δ ≤ (1 − 2
√
2
3
)(A + k), we are in Scenario 1
and there will exist a unique w¯ ≤ w
¯
such that for wˆ satisfying wˆ ≤ w¯ the firm
will Comply. For wˆ ≥ w¯ the firm will Ignore. Here, if we write out w¯, it is
w¯ =
A − 3k
4
+
√
δ(2A + 2k − δ)
4
.
Another unique cut-off occurs when δ satisfies (1 − 2
√
2
3
)(A + k) ≤ δ ≤ δ¯ or
(1 − 2
√
2
3
)(A + k) ≤ δ ≤ A(4 − 3
√
2)
4
+ k. We are then in Scenario 2 and there will
exist a unique w˜ ≥ wˆ such that for wˆ satisfying wˆ ≤ w˜ the firm will comply. For
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wˆ ≥ w˜ the firm will Ignore and w˜ = (
√
2 − 1)A + δ − k√
2
> w
¯
.
If, on the other hand,
A(4 − 3√2)
4
+ k ≤ δ ≤ k, then for all wˆ ∈ [w∗l ,w∗h], the firm
will comply. If δ ≥ k, then the firm will either comply or move. That is, suppose
δ ≥ δ˜ or δ ≥ k . If given a choice between Ignore and Move, the firm will Move
(pii ≤ pih). Then we can focus on the decision between comply and ignore.
Applying a = 1 to proposition 11, we can see that there will not exist a unique
cut-off cutoff w∗ ∈ [w∗l ,w∗h] for wˆ such that if wˆ ≤ w∗, the firm Complies and for
wˆ ≥ w∗ the firm Ignores. This is because −4a3 + 5a2 − 4a + 4 ≥ 0 for a = 1.
So we can conclude that when δ ≥ k, the firm will always comply to the
boycott threat demanding wˆ ∈ [w∗l ,w∗h]. That is, because the there is no techno-
logical edge in region h, it will be actually beneficial for the firm to Comply and
produce in a lower average wage region.
1.3.5 Analysis when a = 1, A = 2, k = 1/3
Now we go over the model and analyses when a = 1, A = 2, k = 1/3 (note here
that this satisfies
(A − 2k)
3
≤ A
4
, or A ≤ 8k) and predict the behavior of the firm
with respect to δ. The two regions have the same productivity but different local
average wage levels specified as wh = wl + 1/3.
Solving the maximization problems of each region, the optimal amounts
of employment are: for the high region, L∗h =
2
4
and for the low region, L∗l =
2 + 1/3
4
. The firm’s respective profits will be pih(L∗h) =
4
8
and pil(L∗l ) =
(2 + 1/3)2
8
.
The corresponding wage level at each region will be w∗h =
2
4
and w∗l =
1
4
. The
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price of good charged to the consumer if firm produces in h is ph =
6
4
and in l,
pl =
6 − 1/3
4
. Since the low wage region yields greater profits than the high wage
region, the firm will always initially produce at l, paying the wage w∗l =
1
4
and
setting the price at pl =
6 − 1/3
4
= 1.417. (Note here that w
¯
=
A − 2k
3
= 0.444.)
The w∗l =
1
4
is known and the C type consumers demand wˆ ∈ [1
4
,
2
4
] for the
workers. What will be the firm’s response? Let’s first calculate the values δ˜ and
δ¯, plugging in a = 1, A = 2, k = 1/3: we get δ˜ = k = 1/3 and δ¯ =
A(4 − 3√2)
4
+ k =
0.212.
According to Proposition 1.5, when δ satisfies δ ≤ 1/3, it is more profitable
for the firm to Ignore than to Move. That is, if the fraction of Caring individuals
becomes greater than 1/3, the size of the demand cut is too large for the firm to
bear, and it will choose to relocate to h rather than to ignore and stay in l.
Let’s now look at the decision between Comply and Ignore. Proposition 1.6
tells us that when δ ≤ δ¯ or δ ≤ 0.212, there exists a unique cutoff w∗ ∈ [1
4
,
2
4
] for
wˆ such that if wˆ ≤ w∗, the firm Complies. When wˆ ≥ w∗, the firm Ignores.
Let’s study the δ ≤ 0.133 case first. Applying a = 1, A = 2, k = 1/3 to
Proposition 1.7, we get a condition for δ: δ ≤ (1− 2
√
2
3
)(A+ k) or δ ≤ 0.133, which
gives us a unique w¯ =
1
4
+
√
δ(4 + 2/3 − δ)
4
such that for wˆ satisfying w¯ ≤ wˆ the
firm will Comply. For wˆ satisfying wˆ ≤ w¯ the firm will Ignore. This corresponds
to scenario 1.
Another unique cut-off occurs when δ satisfies (1 − 2
√
2
3
)(A + k) ≤ δ ≤ δ¯
or 0.133 ≤ δ ≤ 0.212. Then we are in scenario 2 and there will exist a unique
w˜ =
(
√
2 − 1)2 + δ − 1/3√
2
such that for wˆ satisfying w˜ ≤ wˆ the firm will comply.
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For w˜ ≥ wˆ the firm will Ignore.
When δ¯ ≤ δ ≤ δ˜ or 0.212 ≤ δ ≤ 1/3, then for all w∗ ∈ [1
4
,
2
4
], the firm will
Comply.
What will happen when δ ≥ 1/3? We have shown in the previous section that
there will not exist a unique cutoff w∗ ∈ [w∗l ,w∗h] for wˆ such that if wˆ ≤ w∗ the firm
Complies and for wˆ ≥ w∗ the firm Ignores. (This is because −4a3 +5a2−4a+4 ≥ 0
for a = 1.) That is, for all δ that satisfies δ ≥ 1/3, the firm will Comply.
To sum up the above results: for δ ≤ 0.133, there exists a unique w¯ ≤ w
¯
such
that for wˆ satisfying wˆ ≤ w¯, the firm will Comply. For wˆ ≥ w¯ the firm will Ignore.
(This corresponds to scenario 1.) Total welfare is maximized at wˆ = w¯.
For δ satisfying 0.133 ≤ δ ≤ 0.212, there exists a unique w˜ ≥ w
¯
such that for
wˆ satisfying wˆ ≤ w˜, the firm Complies. For wˆ ≥ w˜ the firm will Ignore. (This
corresponds to scenario 2.) Total welfare is maximized at w
¯
, which is less than
w˜.
For δ satisfying 0.212 ≤ δ, for all w∗ ∈ [1
4
,
2
4
], the firm will Comply. (This
corresponds to scenario 3 and 4.) Total welfare is maximized at w
¯
.
1.4 Discussion
Subsection 1.4.1 applies the framework developed above and discusses the In-
donesian example from the Introduction section. In subsection 1.4.2, I discuss
transnational activism in general in relation with product boycotts previously
discussed.
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1.4.1 Discussion - Indonesian Example
Let’s now go back to the Indonesian example of Harrison and Scorse (2006)
presented in the introduction. In 1989, the US government (lobbied by the AFL-
CIO and other labor NGOs) threatened to withdraw special tariff privileges for
indonesian exports if Indonesia failed to address human rights issues. As a re-
sponse, the government mandated minimum wage quadrupled and combined
with the anti-sweatshop activism by the Northern NGOs, the real wages for un-
skilled workers in large foreign-owned textiles, footwear, and apparel exporting
plants significantly increased.
With the increase in minimum wages, aggregate manufacturing employ-
ment decreased, but Harrison and Scorse (2006) did not find any significant
additional impact to the employment of the firms that were exposed to con-
sumer activism. That is, firms faced with boycott campaigns and government’s
minimum wage increase raised the wages and employment went down. The
wage increase, however, was greater than those faced with only the pressure
from the government, the cut in employment was not any more. Moreover, the
targeted firms did not show exits.15
Let’s now analyze the welfare effects of such consumer activism using the
model presented in the previous sections. I have shown that the welfare con-
sequences depend on where the target wage wˆ lies relative to w
¯
. Here, even
though in case of Indonesia there were forces other than consumer activism
that increased the wages, for this exercise let us assume that boycott activism
was the sole source of wage rise. Or we could assume that the government only
15Harrison and Scorse speculate that this may be because of the specific period of data cover-
age - 1990 to 1996 was a period when the garment industry expanded. Since then a lot of plants
have relocated to Vietnam and China.
39
provides the guideline and the activists pressured for compliance. Then the
threat could be thought of as the following: “if you do not comply to minimum
wages set by the government, I will not purchase from you.” Given this threat,
the firm did raise the wages and employment did go down.
From the fact that increase in minimum wages resulted in a decrease in em-
ployment, we can conclude that the boycott activism has decreased employ-
ment. This indicates that wˆ > w
¯
. And since the firms did not close down, we
can conclude that we are in Comply 2 where the firm complied with the de-
mands. Is welfare maximized? No, because as wˆ increases beyond the point of
w
¯
, the welfare started to decrease. Employment went down and the price that
consumer faced started to go up. The wage increased beyond the point where
the total welfare would have been maximized.
1.4.2 Discussion - Transnational Activism
One can think of transnational activism in general using the results of the wel-
fare analysis. As Ali (1996) and Seidman (2007) have pointed out, consumer
campaigns carry the risk of giving the power to the consumers and not to the
workers in making decisions about which labor rights matter and which fac-
tories should be targeted. Moreover, consumers take no responsibility for the
outcome of the campaign: when a plant closes down, it is usually the workers
who have to bear the cost. Let’s give the benefit of the doubt to the activists and
assume that the goal of a boycott campaign is indeed to increase the welfare
of the workers in the developing countries. To make the firm stay and com-
ply with the wage increase demand, such unintended consequences should be
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looked out for.
The risk of a boycott backlash comes directly from two kinds of asymmetry
of information: one between activists and workers, and another between the
firm and activists. Lets examine each in detail.
There has been research that addresses the information asymmetry between
activists and workers and its consequences. The needs of the workers are not
known or they are considered less important to the activists. In 1994 after visit-
ing apparel factories in Honduras to investigate labor rights violations, US labor
rights NGOs conducted campaigns against child labor of the US owned firms
(Anner, 2002). When all under-aged workers were dismissed in response to the
protests, Honduran unionists were in dismay: there was no outside option for
those households in which child labor was inevitable to make ends meet, and
the unions’ most important concern of obtaining the right to organize (which
they had appealed to the NGOs) were not addressed at all. The actions of the
NGOs not only were ineffective but also turned out to be harmful.
The second asymmetry information between the firm and the activists is tied
directly to the welfare analyses in previous sections. As this work implies, the
highest minimum wage that the activists can demand of the firm without it
shutting down or ignoring the threats and thus lowering the wage even more
depends on the estimated population of the boycotters, differences in average
wage levels and relative productivities of production locations. The firm has
information about potential production locations, their productivity, and wages
that will be paid. If such information is not known (due to lack of resources)
then actiivsts will not know how far they can push their demands.
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One way to deal with such asymmetries may be through “brokerage” (Tar-
row, 2006, p. 190), the creation of linkage between previously unconnected ac-
tors and the mediation of the relation. Brokers can facilitate collaboration and
direct communication between organizations. In the boycott framework, an in-
termediate actor (usually an NGO such as the Clean Clothes Campaign) will
collect credible information of the labor market conditions. Transferring infor-
mation between the workers and consumers (potential boycotters) (Keck and
Sikkink, 1998, p. 226) the brokers can help set a goal that can resonate with both.
In order to resolve the asymmetry of information between the firm and the
activists, brokers could again collect information of the different labor markets
and help tailor the activists’ demand. Closing the information gap between the
firm and the activists, however, may be harder. Moreover, there also maybe
situations when there is no way that the firm can stay in a region given the
profitability prospects. When different production regions have the same pro-
ductivity (a = 1 case in subsection 1.3.3) the firm always has an incentive to
produce in a region with the lowest labor cost. Therefore, to attract capital, sub-
contracting firms may lower their wages further, which will lead to a race to the
bottom. Anner (2002, p. 18) presents a case of brazilian autorworkers supplying
for Ford. When the workers flew to Detroit to protest against the firms clos-
ing down in Brazil, the US United Autoworkers Union (UAW) that collaborated
previously with them did not offer any help. For the UAW, either the Brazilian
jobs or their jobs had to go. The outcome could have been different if groups
such as the International Confederation of Free Trade Union played a role of
the broker and linked the production sites and encouraged the workers to act
collectively.
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1.5 Conclusion
Information plays a role not only in mobilizing consumers (Della Porta, 2007,
p. 13) but also in setting the most effective goals which can lead to a successful
campaign. This paper is an attempt to capture such importance of local and
global market knowledge in a tractable model. Activism by the consumers who
have the power to change the behavior of the firm through boycott campaigns
may actually result in a reduction in welfare of the workers when the firm de-
cides to alter its operation by lowering the wage further expecting a demand
decrease (Ignore) or by shutting down and moving elsewhere (Move).
The model shows that depending on parameters δ (number of caring in-
dividuals), k (difference in average local wage level), and a (the difference in
productivity between the possible production regions), firm’s response with re-
gards to boycott activism is determined. An interesting result from this setup
was that depending on wˆ, even when the firm complies, it may have negative
welfare consequences to both the consumers and workers.
An interesting extension for another paper would be to investigate different
scenarios regarding the timing of the announcement of wˆ. Here in my frame-
work, wˆ is known prior to the first stage where the firm decides where to pro-
duce. Suppose that the firm knows wˆ and also that the caring consumers will
protest based on previous direct or indirect experiences of subcontracting. Even
if the expected profit of producing in region l is greater than the expected profit
of producing in h, the firm may not enter l in the first place if the firm fears of
a boycott that may incur losses. That is, suppose pi∗l > pi
∗
h. Then in the previous
analyses, the firm should be choosing region l over h. But if the firm rationally
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expects a boycott movement demanding wˆ, which lies between the equilibrium
wages of the low region and the high region (w∗h > wˆ > w
∗
l ), and if staying in l is
expected to yield less profits than producing in h, (pi∗h ≥ max[pic, pii]), the firm will
choose h to start with and stay there through-out.
A more realistic stylization would be a situation where firm knows the dis-
tribution of wˆ, and only after it starts producing in either of the region, wˆ is
revealed. The firm has a distribution of wˆ in mind from previous experiences of
subcontracting. Depending on the expected pay-offs, the firm may enter l and
exit to h after the wˆ is realized, the firm may never enter l, or may enter l and
stay, either complying to or ignoring the boycott threat.
The result suggests that activists set their goals by studying the labor mar-
kets and coordinating with local groups rather than demanding what may seem
“righteous’. This is particularly true for transnational activist groups, transna-
tional social movement organizations, and Northern trade unions which may
follow a more is better strategy in the absence of detailed information about
local conditions in the countries of the South in which exploited workers are
employed. Brokers such as transnational advocacy network and transnational
labor networks could facilitate communication and collaboration.
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CHAPTER 2
SOLIDARITY OR COMPETITION?: A TALE OF TWO UNIONS
2.1 Introduction
In February 2007, the South Korean Congress passed a Non-regular Workers
Protection Act which required the firms to guarantee regular status to tempo-
rary workers1 of more than two years. The percentage of non-regular workers in
the country was increasing rapidly (doubling from 17% in 2001 to 29% in 2005,
which was the second highest of all OECD countries2) and the government was
attempting to reverse the trend. The Act, however, aroused vehement opposi-
tion from labor activists and scholars. There was no legal restraint to prevent
abuse of the law by the businesses: not only could the firms choose outsourcing
to avoid responsibility over employment and effectively lower the wage, they
could fire the temporary workers or allow their contracts to lapse, before the
law was to go into effect in July 2007.
The response of the firms diverged, some upgrading the contracts and the
others choosing to lay off workers. One firm took an extreme measure: the E-
land Group, a conglomerate ranked 26th in the country in revenue size, let go
more than 700 non-regular workers from its retail stores Homever and Newcore
1There is no consensus in drawing the boundary of non-regular (or temporary) work: de-
pending on what definition one uses, the percentage of non-regular workers in South Korea
in 2005 ranged from 29.1% to 47%. I use the definition that is consistent with the OECD defi-
nition of non-regular employees which results in the figure 29.1%: “workers under fixed-term
contracts, those who do not expect their jobs to last for involuntary and non-economic reasons,
temporary agency workers, and on-call workers.” (Grubb et al., 2007, p.16 p.17) Controlling
for job characteristics, the estimated wage gap between regular and non-regular workers can
range from 5% (Nam et al., 2005) to 19% (Ahn, 2004). I use the term temporary and non-regular
workers interchangeably in this paper.
2There may be measurement errors in these figures which presents a possibility that the
increase is amplified. For a detailed explanation, refer to (Grubb et al., 2007, p.19).
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Outlet in April and May of 2007. In response, the E-land General Labor Union
(EGLU) and the Newcore Labor Union (NLU) - the respective unions of the
employees of the subsidiary firms - joined forces to protest against the mass
dismissals in June 2007.
With an announced strategy of “collective struggle, collective negotiation,
collective agreement,” the two unions coordinated protests and shared finances
and tactics. The protesters were framed as female cashiers in their 30s to 50s
who earned approximately 800,000 Korean Won ($800.00 US) a month working
8+ hours a day sometimes without a single break for six hours. The pictures
of “our mothers” lying down on the store floor arm in arm resisting against
the riot police was powerful enough to draw great sympathy from a public
hostile to labor strives. The protest went on to take over the annual National
Summer Struggle of Labor as various interest groups, enterprise unions, the na-
tional labor party, and national-level trade unions came together and supported
the protesters.
As time went by, however, protests that had been led by over a thousand
people were shrinking rapidly as strikers started to cross the picket-line or went
on to different jobs. By the end of 2007, the media and the public were no longer
interested, and NLU’s and EGLU’s umbrella organizations Korean Confedera-
tion of Trade Unions (KCTU) and Korean Federation of Private Service Workers’
Unions (KPSU) had left the protest sites. By June 2008, there were only fifty to
sixty strikers at most in each union’s protests.
The most unexpected development was the estrangement of the NLU and
the EGLU; the Common Headquarters remained in name only and the mem-
bers of the two unions completely ignored each other at solidarity strike sites
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for other enterprise unions. Divergence in tactics and membership character-
istics were the oft stated reasons why they were no longer collaborating. This
chapter will explore whether there were any other reasons to the split. I examine
how the coalition of the EGLU and the NLU initially formed against the E-land
Group despite their organizational differences and how it was weakened after
three months.
I argue that political opportunities combined with change in objectives with
the progression of negotiation shaped the processes of coalition formation and
dissolution. In June 2007, both unions shared the goal of starting negotiations
with their common unrelenting target. Support from the government and the
public was vital in bringing the firm to the negotiation table. As the EGLU’s
claims gained salience, the NLU had an incentive to frame their issues in terms
of that of the EGLU and join forces. The alliance was mutually beneficial: there
power in numbers and the EGLU benefited from the NLU’s strong finances.
As the strike continued, however, differences in contributed resources and
diverging membership characteristics began to generate tension within the
coalition. When the Group responded to the unions and to their goals asym-
metrically, the two started to clash over tactics and operate independently. Even
after both unions failed to come to an agreement with their respective firms at
the end of September 2007, the widened rift between the two unions could not
be bridged.
The remainder of this chapter is laid out as follows. In Section 2.2, I review
the literature on coalition formation and dissolution. Section 2.3 describes the
data collection method and Section 2.4 reviews the pre-2007 history of the EGLU
and the NLU. In Section 2.5, I describe the coalition formation and in Section
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2.6, its dissolution. Section 2.7 provides a discussion of the process and Section
2.8 concludes. In the appendices I propose a game theoretic framework that
explains the coalition formation mechanism.
2.2 Theory of Coalition Formation and Dissolution
According to Tilly and Tarrow (2007, p. 216), coalition formation is a “creation of
new, visible, and direct coordination of claims between two or more previously
distinct actors.” Resources are shared, but individual organizational identities
are generally preserved (Zald and Ash, 1966, p. 335). Not only is there a shar-
ing of costs in such an arrangement, there are positive externalities3: through
increased numbers of participants and broader coverage of individual charac-
teristics such as age, sex, and socio-economic status, a coalition can give jus-
tification of the pursued goals and draw more external financial and political
support (McCammon and Campbell, 2002; Hathaway and Meyer, 1997; Tarrow,
1994). Intangible resources such as tactics and leadership can also spill-over
within a coalition.
Coalition formation is not without costs. The original goals of organizations
may be marginalized (Hula, 1995; McCammon and Campbell, 2002) and as with
any collective action there will be free-riding. When a coalition becomes too big,
maintenance may become an issue because it takes time and energy for individ-
ual organizations to coordinate (Staggenborg, 1986). Moreover, organizations
may face new opposition because of their partners in the alliance (McCammon
3Meyer and Whittier (2004) finds that the ideas, tactics, style, participants and organizations
of one movement often have a spill-over effect on other social movements. Such way of thinking
can be applied to organizations within a coalition
48
and Campbell, 2002).
When the benefits exceed the costs, organizations will build a coalition (Levy
and Murphy, 2006; Zald and Ash, 1966). For example, a coalition may arise
when there are political or environmental opportunities, new threats to orga-
nizations’ goals, or commonalities in interests and ideology which can be a
basis of a mutually acceptable coalition frame (Croteau and Hicks, 2003; Levy
and Murphy, 2006; McCammon and Campbell, 2002; Mayer and Brown, 2005;
Meyer and Corrigall-Brown, 2004; Meyer and Whittier, 2004; Staggenborg, 1986;
Van Dyke, 2003). Some researchers have found that during a period of re-
source abundance coalitions are more likely to be formed (Staggenborg, 1986;
Van Dyke, 2003; Zald and McCarthy, 1987), while some others have found the
opposite (McCammon and Campbell, 2002).
Once a coalition is formed, cooperative differentiation (Hathaway and
Meyer, 1997; Staggenborg, 1986), a stable source of external funding and aid,
and ideological compatibility (Staggenborg, 1986) can help sustain it.
While the existing literature has focused on the absolute levels of external
and internal factors such as political opportunity, threats, and resources of the
organizations in the potential coalition, it is also useful to examine the relative
levels of these factors within the relationship. It is rarely the case that the in-
volved organizations have identical features or that one organization has higher
levels of all characteristics than the other. That is, even though collective ac-
tion by itself can exercise greater power toward a common target simply by
increasing the number of participants in a movement4, from an organizational
4Not only are social movement organizations that work in coalition more likely to achieve
their goals, mass mobilizing is “one of the few ways that social movements are able to exercise
power” (Van Dyke, 2003).
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perspective, whether the other organization is politically, or socially more (less)
favored or has more (less) resources will matter in its decision to join forces.
When organizations perceive that their quantitative and qualitative differences
are complementary to meeting their goals, a coalition is more likely.
When we start thinking about the organizational characteristics in such rel-
ative terms, several benefits of coalition formation emerge. First is the spill over
of political opportunities. When the claims of an organization gain salience,
others can free-ride on the generated support either by framing their issues in
similar terms or by forming an alliance so as to be identified with the group fac-
ing a conducive environment. This is especially true for interest groups whose
main activity is public protests and who rely on societal support.
Tactical differences among organizations can also be an attraction when con-
sidering a coalition. The modularity of tactics (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007, p. 23) will
provide the organizations with an expanded “tool box” to work from at various
stages of the claims-making process.
The benefits associated with coalitions, however, cannot always maintain a
coalition. While the lack of resources can be a draw for an organization to join
forces with others, it can also invoke sense of depravation during common ac-
tivities and can lead to resentment. Finances are not fully shared unless it is a
merger: organizations exist to promote their own interests and are concerned
with their maintenance after the protests. Even if finances were to be shared
completely, the organization that contributes more resources might feel that
they are not getting enough credit, and the one contributing less might think
that the richer group was not contributing enough.5 Differences in organiza-
5This links to Staggenborg (1986)’s point that for a long-lasting coalition organizations have
to be accepting with different amounts of contributions.
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tional tactics can have negative consequences as well because diverging protest
styles can be a source of dispute. To an organization that employs violent tactics
and thinks moderate activism is not enough to achieve its goals, groups that use
relatively temperate methods will seem like free-riders.
Such conflict may hinder formation of a collective identity and weaken the
coalition. Diani and Bison (2004) suggest that collective identity facilitates co-
operative engagement in social and political conflict together as a group.Dixon
and Hodson (2003) find that union organization facilitates protest only to the
extent that “it builds on strategies, practices, and solidarities already developed
on the shop floor.” Shared identities and/or the absence of significant identity
differences between groups facilitate coalition formation (Van Dyke, 2003). In
an ad hoc coalition or in an event coalition, identity differences may be less rele-
vant (Van Dyke, 2003, p. 228), but for a lasting coalition the “solidarity benefit of
friendship” can be a key factor (Hathaway and Meyer, 1997). Especially in situ-
ations where the main coalition activity is shop floor-based protests, a collective
identity may be important for sustaining the cooperative relationship.
A coalition without a strong collective identity may not be able to withstand
changes in external circumstances (for instance, the firm’s or state’s asymmetri-
cal treatment). When the decision maker uses disparate strategies on the differ-
ent organizations in the coalition, their optimal responses are likely to diverge.
For coalitions built on common activities, this is likely to be a coalition-breaker.
There is a possibility of cooperative differentiation (Hathaway and Meyer, 1997;
Staggenborg, 1986) but without a collective identity linking the organizations, a
sustained collaborative relationship will be difficult.
It may also be the case that the objectives of the protest change over time and
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it is optimal for an organization to form and break alliances depending on its
stage in the claims-making process. Claims-making consists of two elements:
the process, or the making, and the actual claims. The distance between the
claims and the status quo affect how much effort the process entails. But for a
labor dispute that involves negotiation with an oppressive and unwilling firm
or state, the process can often be divided into two stages. The first stage is
the period up to the beginning of the negotiation, and the second stage is the
negotiation itself. The issues of concern to the organizations remain more or
less the same throughout, but the organizations’ immediate interest during the
first stage is getting to the negotiation table and the specifics of their claims are
relatively unimportant. At this stage, because of the benefits described above,
alliances are likely to emerge. Once the coalition succeeds in pressuring the
target and negotiations begin, organizations generally operate independently
because agreements are drawn separately. This stage tend to be institutionalized
when the first stage is not. Now, cooperative relationships are still possible, and
can be useful, but there is not as strong an incentive to bind the organizations
together.
In summary, in addition to the leverage that a committed collective action
brings against a common target, differences in quantity and quality of resources
and diverging membership characteristics can act as a draw for short term or
event coalitions6. Such differences, however, can impede formation of a collec-
tive identity. When the rate of progression differs across organizations within a
coalition, tension may build up and without a collective identity it will be hard
for the coalition to persist. It may also be inherent to the the claims-making
process that once the decision maker starts to respond it is beneficial for orga-
6A term coined by Levy and Murphy (2006)
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nizations to break up. With such framework in mind, I look at the coalition for-
mation and dissolution of the two main actors - the E-land General Labor Union
and the Newcore Labor Union - of the 2007 non-regular workers movement in
South Korea. A labor union is not intrinsically a social movement organization,
a “complex or formal, organization that identifies its goals with the preferences
of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those
goals” (Zald and McCarthy, 1987, p. 20), but it can be thought of as one in situa-
tions where the union initiates a social movement or becomes a part of one. This
was the case for the EGLU and the NLU for the non-regular workers’ movement
in 2007.
2.3 Methods of Research
I have used two ways to explore the mechanism behind the formation and dis-
solution of a coalition between the two labor unions, the EGLU and the NLU.
First, I went through the Korean Integrated News and Database System from
1993 (when the original E-land Union was first conceived) to August 2008.
Most articles related to the unions were concentrated in 2007 and 2008, when
the actual coalition formation took place.7 The database consisted of articles
from 20 online and offline newspapers. Since I have reconstructed the actuali-
ties of the strike based on all newspapers (for example, the announcements of
unions/government/E-land group at a specific period of time, the issues of con-
flict, and the occurrence of protest in size and intensity) the diverging political
spectrum of the papers was helpful. Other documentary data include newslet-
ters, internal communications, and daily protest activity logs available on the
7About 4000 articles
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union’s website8 since 2007.
The second method was actual field research that consisted of structured
interviews in person, over the phone, and through email from March 2008 to
August 2008, and participation in official meetings and protests in May and June
of 2008. I had discussions with multiple members and the leadership of both
unions, the organizers of the National Labor Party that supported the protests,
strategic administrators of the umbrella organization KPSU, social movement
researchers, civilian participants, and journalists that have been following the
movement for over a year.9
2.4 History of Coalition
Before discussing the 2007 coalition, it will be useful for us to trace the his-
tory of the two unions and their brief interaction in 2006 - a loose coalition that
was short-lived. The two claimants in the 2007 E-land struggle were the New-
core labor union (NLU) and the E-land General Labor Union (EGLU). In 2006,
there were three labor representations based in the E-land Group: the NLU, the
(original) E-land Union (ELU) and the Carrefour Union (CLU). In May 2006,
the E-land Group acquired sixteen Carrefour hypermarket stores and the ELU
and the CLU merged in December 2006 to become the EGLU. A triad merger
was initially pushed for but was unsuccessful due to strong objections from the
members of the NLU. The NLU differed from the other unions in membership
characteristics such as age range and employment status, in resources, and in
8http://elandilban.ba.ro
9Even though I did not have a chance to talk to the management of the E-land Group, it
should not matter much since its moves were well-documented. Of course, I can only speculate
on why they have made such decisions.
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its position within the E-land Group.
Founded in 1998, the NLU represented the workers from Newcore, a de-
partment store-turned-outlet bought by the E-land Group in Dec 2003. Newcore
originally was a union shop of regular workers who were mostly young women
and men in their twenties and thirties. The union had lived through grueling
restructuring, default, and acquisition processes that led to a strong organiza-
tional structure. By the end of 2005, NLU had stable finances and enjoyed a
certain preferential treatment in the E-land group due to having one of the most
profitable stores (Kangnam Newcore).
The ELU, the official labor union of the E-land Group, had only fifty mem-
bers in 2006. It was founded in 1993, but the Group took four years to recog-
nize it as a valid negotiation partner: only after fifty-seven days of striking in
1997 did they reach a collective bargaining agreement that guaranteed wage
payment during leave. In 2000, after two-hundred sixty five days of striking,
it achieved improvements in working conditions. Monthly wages of full time
non-regular production workers increased from approximately 400,000 Korean
Won to 560,000 Korean Won ($400 to $560 US dollars) and those with three years
or more of job tenure were to be promoted to regular status. A consensus was
reached that unilateral layoffs and contract lapses were not to occur again. The
strike of the ELU in 2000 and 2001 was referred to by the labor as the first sig-
nificant non-regular workers’ struggle in South Korea. Despite the successful
outcome of the negotiations, however, the long lasting strife left the organiza-
tion with a mere fifty members at the end of 2001.
The CLU was the labor union of the Carrefour Hypermarket. The workers’
fear of unemployment in the acquisition process had led to a sharp increase in
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membership in 2006. About twenty percent of the total workers were union
members and more than half of them were non-regular workers, mostly female
and in their thirties, forties, and fifties. The CLU had succeeded in reaching a
collective agreement with the Carrefour management that specified the future
acquiring firm to recognize the labor union and to guarantee continued em-
ployment of all workers. It also included a clause that prohibited terminating
the contracts of non-regular workers of more than eighteen months.
In May 2006, all three unions were striking against the E-land Group. The
NLU’s claims centered on two issues: a change in wage structure and freedom
of union activities. The NLU was in the middle of its annual wage negotiation
(Im-dan-hyop) period and was protesting against the firm’s proposal of intro-
ducing a yearly salary system for (regular) workers. This meant that individual
wages will be negotiated every year depending on one’s performance evalua-
tion (which was subjective) rather than job tenure. Harassment of union mem-
bers was also an issue. The firm had recently called in over 900 union members
for “disciplinary” purposes to dissuade them from participating in union activ-
ities.
For the ELU, the firm’s circumvention, distortion, and finally a renege of
the collective agreement in March 2006 fueled the protests. Park Sung-soo, the
founder and the current CEO of the E-land Group and a devoted Christian had
famously said that “There is no labor union in the Bible.” The group ignored
or evaded the Collective Agreements of previous years and other labor regu-
lations, and union members were openly disadvantaged in promotion. For in-
stance, even though automatic rehire was guaranteed by the Collective Agree-
ment, workers were forced to go through the recruitment process all over again
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once their contractual period was up. On March 6th, the Group notified the
ELU that the Agreement negotiated in 2001 and annually renewed since then
would be terminated since it did not reflect the “changes in socio-economic cir-
cumstances, the law, and business environment” (Labor Today, 2006-08-31). The
Group thought having to secure the employment of the temporary workers was
too restrictive to its business.
During this time, the CLU was in the middle of an acquisition turmoil and
wanted the E-land Group to guarantee that it would respect the Collective
Agreement drawn between Carrefour and the Union. The Group declined to
give a definite answer which fueled the frustration of the CLU members.
Faced with the same uncooperative firm around the same time, the three
unions formed a “Common Headquarters of the Strikers” (Kongdong-tujaeng-
bonbu). In addition to coordinating protests, they also started to work with each
other towards a merger. Even though the unions were based at different sub-
sidiary firms, the Group had such centralized power over the management of all
its subsidiaries that it was “only natural” to have a unified labor representation
(Interview 1,3).
But the coalition was not a strong one: looking back, one of the union ex-
ecutives from EGLU admitted that the common headquarters in 2006 was of a
top-down talk driven one pushed mainly by the union executives and had failed
to involve the union members (Ohmynews, 2007-09-30). Collective strikes were
small and rare.
The NLU reached an agreement with the Group in July 2006 and remained
in the coalition in name only. After that, there were few attempts at collective
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action between the ELU and the CLU with little success. In December 2006, the
ELU and the CLU merged and formed the EGLU without the NLU. The two
were both weak and a formal merger was a way of pooling their resources and
revitalizing the organization.
2.5 Coalition Formation
A major concern in labor at the beginning of 2007 was the Non-regular Protec-
tion Act to be voted on in February 2007. According to the law, not only would
the employer have to upgrade non-regular workers of two years or more to
regular status, it would become explicitly illegal to pay differential wages de-
pending on one’s employment status. Of course there was no legal restraint to
prevent the misuse of the law by businesses: firms could outsource the jobs to
avoid responsibility over employment and effectively lower the wages. They
could also fire or lapse the contracts of the non-regular workers before the law
was to go into effect in July 2007. Even though such points were raised by
unions and labor scholars, the law was passed by the government in February
and went into effect in July as scheduled.
The E-land Group responded to the law exactly as predicted. In late 2006,
contracts for non-regular workers were shortened for easy firing. Homever,
(former Carrefour, where most EGLU members worked) which had followed
the 3-6-12 system, changed the schedule to a 3-6-6 one. Originally, after the ini-
tial 3 months of a contract, the employee would get a 6-month contract which
was followed by a 12-month one. By the end of 2006, the non-regular workers
expecting a 12-month contract were faced with a 6-month one instead. For New-
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core (where most NLU members worked), the original 6-month contract was
shortened to a 3 month one. After the final 6 months (for Homever) or 3 months
(for Newcore) the contracts were lapsed. Newcore, in addition, started to use a
zero-month contract that did not specify a fixed contractual period. Before the
Protection Act went into effect in July 2007, over seven hundred non-regular
workers from Newcore and Homever were laid off in April and May. The goal
of the two unions - maintaining and improving the welfare of the workers - was
being threatened.
In March 2007, again under the name of the Common Headquarters of the
Strikers, the NLU and the EGLU united their forces to protest against the mass
dismissals. The common headquarters announced a strategy of collective strug-
gle, collective negotiation, and collective agreement, a “mindful gesture” to pre-
vent a recurrence of the firm’s divide-and-rule tactics of the year before. The
union executives were well aware that when the three unions had struggled to-
gether the previous year, the coalition had lost momentum and more or less had
dissolved after the NLU came to an agreement with the firm (Interview 4).
The two unions represented distinct groups of people with different claims.
For the NLU, it was not the firing of non-regular workers that initiated the
strike. Even though the union had succeeded in drawing a favorable Collec-
tive Agreement the previous year, the year 2007 had begun badly. In December
2006, after introducing the PDA (personal digital assistant) system in the cash
register area of stores, the firm transferred regular worker cashiers to other sec-
tions or branches (requiring relocation) without their consent and started out-
sourcing those jobs. Rumors about selling the profitable Kangnam branch was
another point of dispute. The Group was experiencing financial problems from
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overstretching itself to acquire 16 Carrefour markets in 2006. Newcore’s most
profitable store, the Kangnam branch, was on the merge and acquisition market
which meant that over a thousand workers would eventually face restructur-
ing. The firm’s reassurance that it would oversee the operation even after the
sale did not appease the union members.10
For the NLU, the dispute over non-regular contracts and the Act were sec-
ondary. The union only began to recruit non-regular workers for the first time
in April 2007.11 The acting head of the NLU in June 2008 said, “For us, we made
it clear from the start to the union members that this was not a non-regular
workers’ protest. We were fighting mainly against the forced transfers - the
unilateral restructuring that came with the introduction of the PDA system - in
December 2006. Employment stability of non-regular workers was only a part
of our agenda. The regular workers joined in because there was an understand-
ing that if non-regular workers suffered from job insecurity, then it would be
their turn soon.” (Interview 3) The regular worker union members were recep-
tive to the influx. For them, protecting the non-regular workers was in line with
their other goals since it was a means of protecting their own jobs.
On the other hand, the EGLU’s claims were specifically focused on non-
regular employment. Of 1,500 union members, more than half were non-regular
workers (which is rare for South Korea in general: while the overall union mem-
bership is 20%, only 1% of the union members are non-regular workers) whose
immediate concern were the employment guarantee. The firm was not abiding
by the Collective Agreement from the Carrefour days, which required upgrad-
10The firm was supposed to confer with the union a month before merger and acquisition
process but it did not.
11Interestingly this was after the initiation meeting of the Common headquarters in March
2007.
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ing workers of 18 months or more to regular status. In addition, the firm had
started to operate 24 hours a day and also on national holidays without any
discussions with the union.
The passage of the Non-regular Workers Protection Act and the E-land
Group’s response to it, allowed the unions to overcome such differences. More-
over, since the first few weeks of the strike was intended to pressure the manage-
ment of the E-land Group to start negotiating, the exact demands of each union
did not matter. To unite against the common opponent, the building of a “con-
sonant frame pyramid” (Croteau and Hicks, 2003; Meyer and Corrigall-Brown,
2004) was important for generating external support as well as for forging in-
ternal solidarity. The common headquarters framed the protest as a “struggle
for eliminating the discrimination against non-regular workers” and started to
pressure the firm. It was “only natural” for the unions to unite against the “ex-
ploitative capitalist” (Interviews 1,2,4). The fight, however, was not only di-
rected at the Group. Faced with an unrelenting firm that had no intention of
rehiring laid off workers or guaranteeing continued employment for the non-
regulars, the unions needed public’s and governmental support to change the
firm’s behavior.
In addition to the negotiating leverage provided by the committed collective
action, protesting with many people had emotional benefits. Interviewed mem-
bers talked of feeling less threatened by the riot police (who were almost always
present at protest sites) and the often-violent counter-activist-mobs (“Firm Res-
cue Force”) employed by the firm, when demonstrating with others.
The coalition also increased the strategic capacity of involved organizations
through resource spill-overs and sharing. “Office space, staff experience and re-
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lationships with authorities and allies” (Ganz 2000; Murphy 2002) were shared
and contributed to drawing external support and pressuring the firm.
In addition to the qualitative variation between the unions, the quantitative
difference of finances and political and societal support created a mutual incen-
tive to build a coalition. Based in a union shop, the NLU was financially stable
while the EGLU was not. The relatively wealthy NLU lent 5,000,000 Korean
Won ($5,000 US) to the EGLU at the start of the collective struggle and always
paid more than the EGLU for common expenses. The NLU executive estimated
that about 50,000,000 Korean Won ($50,000 US) was transferred to the EGLU
over the protesting period. The EGLU had an incentive to cooperate with the
NLU.
On the tactical front, EGLU’s executives were from the former E-land Labor
Union, and had experiences of long-term protests against the E-land Group.
Moreover, while most of the EGLU members were married, female, non-regular
workers of ages ranging from 30s to 50s, the NLU members were mostly single,
female regular workers in their 20s who were in general more reserved. The
older women of the EGLU had fewer qualms about explosive strikes and led
the coalition to receive more media attention.
The diverging membership did not play a role through tactics alone. The
public was receptive to the elderly women of the EGLU. Framed as “our moth-
ers in their 30s to 50s who earn approximately 800,000 Korean Won ($800 US) a
month (approximately $5.00 per hour), who sometimes work without a single
break for six hours,” the protesters succeeded in drawing sympathy from a Ko-
rean public that is generally hostile to labor strives. The NLU, mostly consisted
of young, regular workers whose working conditions were significantly better
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benefited from such identity framing.
Starting with a collective protest (the 10th of June), the NLU went on an
“indefinite strike” on the 22nd of June, followed an in-house picketing strike
conducted by the EGLU (with workers blocking entry and occupying one of the
most profitable branches of Homever for fifteen consecutive days) on the 30th
of June. NLU soon joined the in-house picketing strike at their own Kangnam
branch on July 8th. The public responded by joining the demonstrations outside
the stores and boycotting the products manufactured and sold by the E-land
Group. When people started to blame the Non-regular Protection Act for the
mass firing, the Ministry of Labor also started to exert pressure to the Group.
On July 10th the Group agreed to negotiate with both unions.
During the first few weeks at the protests the NLU and the EGLU were in-
distinguishable from one another: the media acknowledged both leadership
together as the Common Headquarters. Interest groups, various enterprise
unions, the national labor party, and national level trade unions announced sol-
idarity and supported the cause. The theme of the annual Summer Struggle
of Labor became the non-regular contracts and the public participated actively
in the protests and product boycotts against the E-land Group. The coalition
succeeded in forcing the firm to start negotiating.
2.6 Coalition Dissolution
The beginning of, and progress in, the negotiations did not mean the protests
were over. As one officer of the Korean Private Service Workers’ Union put it,
“Negotiating and protesting concurrently is a strategy unions use. Protest gives
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us leverage at the negotiation table” (Interview 4). The protest continued into
September.
The Korean Thanksgiving day (August 15th in the lunar calendar, which fell
on the third week of September in 2007) is one of the two biggest national holi-
days of the year. This is when the greatest proportion of revenue is reaped by the
distributing companies such as Newcore and Homever. In September, the tide
was turning in favor of the E-land workers: if the protest ended before Thanks-
giving, the firms could partially make up for the losses they had incurred - esti-
mated at fifty to one hundred million dollars - from sit-in protests and boycotts
during previous months.12 The government had the Annual Inspection of the
State Government in October and a presidential election in December. The Min-
ister of Labor, Lee Sang-soo, who was open about wanting to run for Congress
the upcoming year, started to pressure the E-land Group for more active nego-
tiations. This was a definite opening of a political opportunity structure for the
protesters.
The Group’s receptiveness, however, was uneven: while the E-land Group
was somewhat responsive to the demands of the NLU, it was adamantly against
those of the EGLU. Such divergence originated from the difference in member-
ship characteristics which shaped organizational goals. Even though the overall
movement was framed as a non-regular workers’ struggle, each union had dis-
tinct claims based on their membership.
The NLU’s demands in September 2007 were fivefold: 1) elimination of out-
sourcing with respect to the adoption of the PDA system, 2) reinstallment of
regular workers who were involuntarily transferred the previous year, 3) an em-
12An informal survey cited by the Daily Labor News (Sep 9th, 2007) estimated about 30%
decrease in sales for the E-land Group.
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ployment guarantee for non-regular workers of three months or more, 4) rehir-
ing of all the workers that were fired or faced contract relapse after January 2007
and guaranteeing their employment, and 5) withdrawal of all legal charges13
initiated by the firm against the union members from the sit-in protests. The
firm was offering: 1) elimination of outsourcing in within ten months, 2) rein-
stallment of involuntarily transferred regular workers after individual consulta-
tion with administrators, 3) guaranteeing employment for one more contractual
term for non-regular workers of three months or more, 4) rehiring of laid-off
workers for one more term and trying to employ them continuously, and 5)
withdrawal of all charges against the workers but not the union executives.
The EGLU’s claims were: 1) re-employment of workers that had been fired
since January 2007, 2) upgrading non-regular contracts to regular ones for work-
ers of 18 months or more, 3) employment guarantee for non-regular workers
of three months and more, 4) dropping of all charges against the union mem-
bers initiated by the firm from the sit-in protests. The firm’s position was 1)
re-employment of fired workers for another contractual period, 2) employment
guarantee14 of workers of 18 months or more but with a different pay schedule
than the regular workers, 3) one more contractual period for workers of three
months or more, and 4) withdrawal of all charges against the workers but not
the union executives.
Once the negotiations began, the firm made it clear that they would be treat-
13which was approximately 5,000,000 Korean Won ($5,000 per person)
14Employment guarantee was a guarantee of no involuntary layoff and was not a promise
of upgrade to regular status. The Group created a new wage - benefit table for such workers :
the wage would be the same as that of the non-regular workers, (which was at least 20% less
than the regular workers for the same job description) but only with continuing employment.
Since before 2007 the non-regular contracts were more or less automatically renewed, what the
firm was saying was that it would return to the status quo and distort the intention of the Non-
regular Workers Protection Act ’s goal of improving the welfare of temporary workers.
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ing the unions separately, and the extent to which the Group responded to each
union diverged. The negotiations of the NLU and the firm over the clauses such
as the elimination of outsourcing and reinstallment of the regular workers who
were involuntarily transferred indicates that the Group was more receptive to
the demands of the NLU regarding regular worker-related issues. Even though
the terms related to non-regular workers were meagerly addressed, the NLU
became more willing to compromise as the negotiation continued: by the end of
September, there were only approximately 50 non-regular worker members left,
compared to 1500 regular workers. Most of the EGLU’s members and protesters
were non-regulars: there was not much space to compromise when the Group
did not want to give up flexibility of temporary employment.
While the negotiations between the E-land Group and the NLU progressed
at a fast pace, EGLU had a hard time even scheduling and convening meetings.
When the firm made it clear from the start that the EGLU’s demands would not
be met, EGLU would cancel the scheduled negotiation to go on to a more explo-
sive strike. The EGLU thought that only through protest could they break out
of the stalemate. The firm, claiming that the EGLU did not have any intention
to engage in negotiations, would then cancel the next scheduled session.
When the firm demanded a stop in protests during the negotiation period,
the NLU accepted but the EGLU declined. It was during this time that the coali-
tion between the two unions became weak both at the leadership level and at the
membership level. The varying rate of negotiation progressions led to different
preferred tactics for NLU and EGLU. The number and degree of independent
strikes by the EGLU (without the NLU) increased significantly.
The ultimate point of incoordination within the coalition came on September
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16th when the EGLU went into another occupation strike despite warnings from
the firm and the government. The NLU, in the process of drafting its agreement
with the firm, declined to join the EGLU. Members of the NLU are quoted as
saying “Who is going to be responsible (if things go wrong)?” (Interview 4) The
penalty for a sit-in protest was too high for the NLU workers at the time when
they were finally coming close to a successful agreement. The EGLU alone went
on a sit-in protest to be met by the riot police.
NLU failed to come to an agreement in the end because of the non-regular
worker-related demands and the firm’s intent to punish the union executives.
For EGLU, there was not even a negotiation proper : neither side relented from
their original positions in the few times the firm and the union actually got
together.
After September 2007, the Common Headquarters remained in name only.
Even though a collective protest was planned, at Newcore protests E-land Gen-
eral members were nowhere to be seen and vice versa. Members ignored each
other when they occasionally crossed paths at solidarity strike sites for other
unions. Before September 2007, the Common Headquarters had deliberately
pushed the firm to hold negotiations with both unions at the same time in adja-
cent locations. After September 2007, negotiations became an entirely separate
process. The bargaining environment significantly deteriorated for both once
Thanksgiving and the State Inspection period were over.
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2.7 Coalition Discussion
Was such an estrangement inevitable? I analyze the changes that occurred in
those three months that led to coalition dissolution in this section.
Changes in Goals of Protest
In March 2007, the coalition was formed to draw external support as well as
to gain leverage from collective action to pressure the firm out to the negotiation
table. Political and environmental opportunities for the EGLU spilled over to
the NLU and resources flowed in to the coalition from outside as well as being
transferred from the NLU to the EGLU. The details of the claims of the unions
were relatively less important during this stage.
When the talks began in July 2007, the objective for each organization was
to come to a successful agreement reflecting their claims as much as possible.
With the struggle dragging on longer than expected, whether this negotiating
was done individually or collectively was not important to the union members.
The consonant frame of “struggle for eliminating the discrimination of non-
regular workers” that previously facilitated coalition formation was not com-
pelling enough to bring the workers together during this period. The firm and
unions to fight over specific clauses in the Collective Agreement and the details
of the claims pursued were increasingly important. As an organization mainly
composed of regular workers, the NLU was relatively more willing to compro-
mise on the non-regular workers related clauses: for them, protecting the non-
regular workers was simply a means to an end of protecting the regular jobs.15
15The EGLU also have used such logic when it was recruiting regular workers from its work-
place. The union, however, was inherently opposed to the interpretation of the non-regulars as
shields of the regulars.
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The EGLU, on the other hand, mainly were concerned with the instability of
non-regular employment.
Varying Progression of Negotiations
With such changes in organizational goals came differences in the rates at
which negotiations progressed. In March 2007, the firm was repressive against
both unions and their respective demands. Once the negotiations started in July
2007, it became more attentive to the claims of the NLU, willing to compromise
on the regular worker-related clauses. The firm led separate negotiations with
each union and the sessions with the EGLU were often cancelled.
Since the goal was to reach an agreement in favorable terms, the NLU and
the EGLU resorted to different tactics in response to differentiated treatment.
While the NLU agreed to stop demonstrating during the negotiation period,
the EGLU went on with its own protests. To break the negotiation stalemate,
the EGLU planned another sit-in strike in September 2007. Not only did the
NLU decline to join in, it rejected the EGLU executives’ request to come to the
NLU’s meeting to persuade the NLU members to participate. Resentment grew
within the EGLU: if NLU came to a Collective Agreement and left the coalition
it could act as a strikebreaker for the EGLU. Not only would resources coming
from the NLU decrease, but the EGLU’s bargaining power from collective action
would surely diminish.
Asymmetric Finances
From the founding of the coalition the EGLU was financially dependent on
loans from the NLU. This gap in organizational resource levels was apparent
at protest sites and affected the sentiments of the workers. The issue of lunch
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came up in multiple interviews. “When the NLU members ate lunch boxes of
5,000 Korean Won ($5.00 US) value, the EGLU members ate a simple sushi roll
(kim-bob) of 1,000 Korean Won ($1.00 US) value. This might not seem like a big
deal but imagine this happening every day for three months. This in addition to
the fact that NLU members were mostly regular workers when EGLU members
were not. ... The apparent difference of status dwarfed the EGLU members’
spirits as the protests continued.” (Interview 2)
The difference in financial contributions to the coalition also affected both
sides. Those interviewed spoke of the frustration that the NLU members felt in
not being appreciated and acknowledged by the EGLU or the public. On the
other hand, the EGLU members resented that the NLU did not contribute more
when they clearly could.
Diverging Membership Characteristics
Each union was a relatively homogenous group in age, sex, marital and em-
ployment status. The NLU consisted mainly of young, regularly-employed,
single women in their 20s and the EGLU of older, temporarily employed mar-
ried females in their 30s, 40s, and 50s. The only commonality was their gender.
Given that seniority tends to drive the dynamics between individuals in Ko-
rea, bonding between people of different age groups would have been difficult.
Cultural difference was prominent. The young Newcore women were more re-
served and quieter than the older EGLU members. “Because they are young in
their twenties, they will just come and sit there, re-doing their make up, watch-
ing TV, sending text messages and playing video games on their phones.” (In-
terview 5) From the point of view of the NLU workers, however, “The EGLU
women were too violent and fearless, not thinking about the consequences. We
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are different.” (Interview 6) The divergent membership characteristics, in addi-
tion to the homogeneity of each group, caused a rift between the two unions as
the protests continued.16
Since the coalition’s main activity was collective protests where all the mem-
bers physically sat side-by-side almost every day for long stretches of time, the
sense of unity or solidarity, the we-ness, among members was important. The
unions’ asymmetric finances and divergent membership characteristics seem to
have hindered formation of a common identity. Even if they had used differ-
ent tactics in the face of changes in external environment they could have had a
closer relationship collaborating with each other. Without a collective identity,
however, there was not a room for a cooperatively differentiating coalition.
2.8 Conclusion
In June 2008, the Group announced its plan to sell Homever (EGLU’s base firm)
to a Samsung Homeplus Tesco, another retailing conglomerate. The NLU, after
434 days of strike, reached an agreement with the E-land group in early Septem-
ber 2008 with significantly worse terms than what had been offered the year be-
fore. The NLU not only gave up on all the clauses (in pages 63 and 64) in order
to avoid legal charges (which amounted to approximately 10 million US dol-
lars) and the re-employment of the regular workers that were on strike, it also
agreed to withdraw its rights to protest until the end of 2010. The 36 cashiers
with relapsed contracts were rehired under brand-new contracts without any
16David Meyer made an interesting observation that it was actually in the firm’s interest to
prolong the negotiations to stoke tension between the unions as well as to gain leverage against
each union.
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employment guarantees.
The EGLU drew out a collective agreement with the Samsung Homeplus
Tesco, its new base firm, in November 2008 after 510 days of strike. Unlike the
Collective Agreement between the NLU and the E-land Group, they agreed on
directly employing temporary workers (no outsourcing) and increasing their
wages as well as granting paid leaves. The union members that were fired be-
cause of the strike were also re-employed and the legal charges were settled.
The labor union in turn withdrew its rights to protest till the end of 2010 and
agreed to delegate the wage changes to the firm for a certain period of time.
The union representatives voluntarily retired. The Collective Agreement was
drawn a month and a half after the Homever hypermarkets were acquired by
the Samsung Homeplus Tesco.
Considering the opportunity costs of striking for more than a year, the out-
come of the negotiations cannot be said to have been successful especially for
the NLU. If the coalition had sustained, could the results have been any differ-
ent? That is, given that the unions negotiate separately, would a cooperatively
differentiating relationship have been beneficial? It does not seem so: the E-land
Group entirely lost interest in negotiations after September 2007 and more after
December 2007 (when the current “business-friendly” president of the country
was elected). The negotiation outcomes achieved by the NLU, which stayed
under the E-land Group, were dismal. According to the members of the EGLU,
their relatively favorable Collective Agreement was due to their new firm Sam-
sung Homeplus Tesco, which was much more willing to negotiate and compro-
mise. More than anything else, the attitudes of the challenged firms played the
decisive role in the negotiation outcomes and it is not easy to see how a loose
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sense of coalition could have helped in the negotiation process.
Yet it is interesting to study the coalition dynamics because coalition forma-
tion and dissolution are inevitably linked with the life cycle of a movement.
With the passage of the Non-regular workers Protection Act and the E-land
Group’s adverse response, the two labor unions had joined forces and led the
non-regular workers movement, which later took over the country’s 2007 An-
nual Summer Struggle of Labor. It is hard to know how much the coalition dis-
solution contributed to the weakening of the movement. But from a collective-
action perspective, the pressure on the firm and to the government definitely
decreased when the NLU, consisting of over 1000 union members, began to fo-
cus its efforts more on the regular workers’ issues with the start of negotiations.
I have examined the coalition focusing on the relative levels of external and
internal factors, such as political opportunity, threats, and resources of the two
unions. Externally, the comparable threat to their goal - the welfare of the work-
ers - experienced by each union initially drew the two distinct actors together.
It was natural for them to join forces when faced with a common opponent
that was infamous for its repression of union activities: a committed collective
action could provide them a certain leverage against the firm. The specifics of
their demands did not matter when the coalition was being initiated because the
purpose was simply to bring the Group to the negotiation table. Once the talks
convened, however, the focus then turned to the actual claims. The firm was
relatively more yielding to the regular employment related clauses which made
the NLU’s negotiations progress rapidly compared to the EGLU’s. Since the
goal of each union then became to reach a favorable Collective Agreement with
the firm, the separate negotiations were not conducive to coalition maintenance
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given such differing status. Moreover, conflict over tactics began to arise: close
to coming to an agreement, the NLU was moderate in their protests. In order to
break the negotiation stalemate, EGLU went on yet another sit-in strike.
Qualitative and quantitative variations in resources, protest style, and mem-
bership characteristics drew the two unions together at first. Not only were
there resource sharing and spill-over, the divergent membership characteris-
tics (such as age and employment status) provided the coalition a justification
of their protests and resulted in an unprecedented public support. When the
protest continued, however, the differences in union and membership charac-
teristics hindered them from building a collective identity.
With no grounded sense of solidarity, the coalition could not withstand the
pressure when the Group started to respond to the unions and their claims
asymmetrically in negotiations. The structure of the two-step claims-making
process - the first leading to the launch of the negotiations and the next the ac-
tual negotiations - did not help either. Even after both unions failed to come to
agreements in September 2007, the widened rift between the two organizations
were never patched and the coalition remained in name only. Such develop-
ment was inevitable with the negotiations dragging on.
This work draws attention to the collective action of the workers in a work-
place with different types of employment contracts. The conflicts stemming
from the status gap between the regular and temporary workers are not re-
stricted to the EGLU-NLU case . How can a successful labor-labor collective ac-
tion arise when the two groups perceive themselves to be dividing a fixed-sized
pie? How can we forge an overarching collective identity? These questions are
potential topics for further work.
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CHAPTER 3
POVERTY EFFECTS OF THEMINIMUMWAGE: THE ROLE OF
HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYMENT COMPOSITION
3.1 Introduction
Minimum wages are commonly evaluated by labor economists in one of two
ways. Some analysts pay primary attention to the fact that a higher mini-
mum wage increases the labor market earnings of those employed, while oth-
ers emphasize that a higher minimum wage would normally be expected to
reduce the number employed (Brown, 1999; Ehrenberg and Smith, 2006; Borjas,
2005). However, an analysis of the effects of these labor market consequences
on poverty, which is the ultimate focus of much of the policy discourse, requires
two further steps. First, the employment composition of the labor market has
to be translated into the employment composition of each household. Second, a
method of income sharing within the household must be specified.
In a previous paper (Fields and Kanbur, 2007), in a model with only two
types of workers - employed and unemployed - we focused primarily on dif-
ferent ways that incomes might be shared within households and how each
affected the impact of minimum wages on poverty. In this chapter we assume
perfectly equal income sharing within the household, and focus instead on em-
ployment composition. We develop the household distribution of income from
the labor market outcomes for a model with good jobs, bad jobs and unemploy-
ment, and adults and youths searching for jobs. Such a structure allows us,
for example, to incorporate the fact that in countries such as the United States,
many minimum wage workers live in non-poor households (Burkhauser et al.,
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2000). Then the increase of minimum wages will not be an effective tool for
alleviating poverty. The impact of a minimum wage on poverty then depends
crucially on the employment composition of households at different levels of in-
come. We ask, when exactly does a higher minimum wage raise poverty, when
does it lower poverty, and when is poverty unchanged?
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents
the main features of the model. Section 3.3 derives the effect of a small increase
in the minimum wage. Section 3.4 extends the analysis to large changes in the
minimum wage. Section 3.5 summarizes and concludes. Appendices C.1 and
C.2 presents proofs for propositions.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 The Labor Market and Household Employment Compo-
sition
In this paper, it is assumed that there is a fixed number of households, normal-
ized at 1. Each household consists of two household members: one adult and
one youth. Thus, the total labor supply is 2.
The labor market has two types of jobs. High wage jobs, h, pay a wage wh.
The wage of these “good job” is assumed to be invariant to any changes tak-
ing place elsewhere in the labor market. Employment in the high wage sector,
denoted xh, is determined according to a standard downward-sloping labor de-
mand curve xh = f (wˆh), f ′ < 0. Low wage jobs, l, pay a minimum wage wl, which
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is determined as a matter of public policy. Employment in these “bad jobs” in
the low wage sector is also determined according to a standard downward-
sloping labor demand curve xl = g(wˆl), g′ < 0. It is assumed that only adults
can be employed in the high wage sector. Adults who fail to find employment
in the high wage sector, together with youths, form an undifferentiated pool of
applicants for low wage jobs.
The low wage wl is of course less than the high wage wh, and households in
which both members are employed earn more than households in which only
one is employed. In addition, we assume that the low wage is greater than half
the high wage. Together, these assumptions imply that
0 <
wˆl
2
<
wh
2
< wˆl <
wˆl + wh
2
These inequalities will be maintained throughout this paper.
We now discuss the number of persons earning each of these amounts and
the per capita household incomes. Employment in the high wage and low wage
sectors are respectively xh and xl. Given that the high wage sector employs only
adults, the number of whom is normalized at 1, the number of adults seeking
low wage jobs is 1 − xh. In addition, all youth (the number of which is normal-
ized at 1) also seek low wage jobs. Thus, the number of applicants for low wage
jobs is 2 − xh, and the probability that a low wage applicant gets a job is xl2 − xh .
An adult can be employed in a high wage job with probability xh, employed in
a low wage job with probability (1 − xh) xl2 − xh , or unemployed with probability
(1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh ). A youth can be employed in a low wage job with probabil-
ity
xl
2 − xh or unemployed with probability 1 −
xl
2 − xh . Putting these respective
wages and employment probabilities together, we have six possible types of
households, where Ai, i = h, l, u is the employment state of the adult and Y j,
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j = l, u is the employment state of the youth; see Table 3.1 All household mem-
Table 3.1: Types of Households and Distribution of Earnings.
Type Number Total Household
of household of Occurrences Household Earnings
Earnings Per Capita
H1. (Ah, Yl) xh
xl
2 − xh wh + wˆl
wh + wˆl
2
H2. (Al, Yl) (1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(
xl
2 − xh ) 2wˆl wˆl
H3. (Ah, Yu) xh(1 − xl2 − xh ) wh
wh
2
H4. (Al, Yu) (1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh ) wˆl
wˆl
2
H5. (Au, Yl) (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )(
xl
2 − xh ) wˆl
wˆl
2
H6. (Au, Yu) (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh ) 0 0
bers are assumed to share their earnings. Hence household earnings per capita
is the relevant measure of the well-being of each individual in the household.
Clearly the poorest individuals are those who live in households where nobody
works (H6). Next come individuals in households where one member is unem-
ployed but the other member is employed in the minimum wage sector (H4 and
H5). Given our assumption that the high wage is less than twice the low wage,
the case where the adult has a high wage job but the youth is unemployed (H3)
gives lower per capita income than the case where both the adult and the youth
are employed in the low wage sector (H2). Finally, the highest household per
capita income occurs when the adult has a good job and the youth is employed
in the minimum wage sector (H1). Table 3.1 sets out, therefore, the income dis-
tribution in this society. We turn now to the measurement of poverty based on
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this income distribution.
3.2.2 How Poverty Is Measured
Poverty in this paper is measured in absolute terms. The analysis consists of de-
termining how poverty in the labor market varies with changes in wˆl. Poverty is
gauged by comparing the households labor market earnings to a fixed poverty
line z. The poverty line is $zper person, i.e., $2z per household.
How high the fixed poverty line is itself allowed to vary. Five cases are an-
alyzed in this paper. Moving from the lowest poverty line to the highest, they
are:
Case 1 : 0 < z <
wˆl
2
<
wh
2
< wˆl <
wˆl + wh
2
Case 2 : 0 <
wˆl
2
< z <
wh
2
< wˆl <
wˆl + wh
2
Case 3 : 0 <
wˆl
2
<
wh
2
< z < wˆl <
wˆl + wh
2
Case 4 : 0 <
wˆl
2
<
wh
2
< wˆl < z <
wˆl + wh
2
Case 5 : 0 <
wˆl
2
<
wh
2
< wˆl <
wˆl + wh
2
< z.
Case 1 is where the poverty line is so low that only households with all mem-
bers unemployed are poor. Case 2 brings into the poverty net those households
where one member is unemployed but the other member has a minimum wage
job. These households will benefit from a rise in the minimum wage if they
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hold onto the minimum wage job. Case 3 widens the poverty net still further
to include households where the adult is employed in the high wage sector but
the youth is unemployed. Case 4 sets the poverty line at a sufficiently high level
that income from two minimum wage jobs is not enough to pull the household
out of poverty. Finally, Case 5 is the extreme case where the poverty line is
so high that everybody is in poverty. Observers who argue that the minimum
wage does not target poverty very well are clearly thinking of Cases 1 through
through 4, in which non-poor households have minimum wage earners. But in
Cases 2 through 5, poor households also have minimum wage workers. Hence
in Cases 2, 3 and 4, minimum wage workers are to be found in both poor and
non-poor households.
In all cases, poverty is gauged using the class of absolute poverty indices
developed by Foster et al. (1984). The FGT index, denoted Pα, takes each poor
person’s poverty deficit as a percentage of the poverty line, raises it to a power
α, and averages over the entire population. Letting yi be the income of the i-th
person, z the poverty line, q the number of poor persons, and n the total number
of persons, the Pα poverty measure is given by:
Pα =
1
n
q∑
i=1
(z − yi
z
)α
.
Three specific values of α are of particular interest. As is well known, when
α = 0 this measure collapses to the headcount ratio, the fraction of people below
the poverty line. Other interesting values of α are when α is greater than or
equal to one. Benchmark values in this range areα = 1, in which case we have
the income gap measure of poverty, and α = 2, which is known as the squared
poverty gap measure. The higher is α, the greater is the sensitivity of poverty
to changes in the incomes of the poorest compared to the incomes of the not so
poor. For these reasons, α is known as the poverty aversion parameter. To allow
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for the social loss from poverty to increase at an increasing rate as incomes fall
relative to the poverty line, α must be greater than 1. Because of the intuitive
appeal of integer values of α, it is common for empirical poverty researchers to
choose α = 2. Different degrees of poverty aversion will be seen to be important
in delineating the consequences of the minimum wage for poverty.
We turn now to the poverty effects of higher minimum wages in this model.
3.3 The Poverty Effects of a Higher Minimum Wage Within
Each of the Five Cases
We have set forth five cases above. For each of these five cases, different types
of tradeoffs are involved in raising the minimum wage. The results are summa-
rized in Table 2
The detailed derivations are given in the Appendix C.1. Here we will pro-
vide an intuitive discussion of the results. The results fall into three groups and
will be discussed accordingly: 1) The results for α = 0, in which
dPα
dwˆl
> 0. 2)
The results for Case 1, also in which
dPα
dwˆl
> 0 3) The results for α ≥ 1 in Cases 2
through 5, in which
dPα
dwˆl
> (<)0 if the elasticity of labor demand in the minimum
wage sector η is sufficiently high (low).
The first set of results (for α = 0) can be understood in a similar way for all
five cases. When α = 0, the poverty measure being used is the poverty head-
count ratio. A higher minimum wage causes more people to become unem-
ployed, which raises the number of households in poverty, i.e.,
dPα
dwˆl
> 0. Given
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Table 3.2: Summary of Results Concerning the Effect of a Minimum Wage
Increase on Poverty as Gauged by Pα.
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5
α = 0
dPα
dwˆl
> 0
dPα
dwˆl
> 0
dPα
dwˆl
> 0
dPα
dwˆl
> 0
dPα
dwˆl
= 0
When η is When η is When η is When
α = 1
dPα
dwˆl
> 0 sufficiently sufficiently sufficiently η ≥ (≤)1,
high (low) high (low) high (low)
dPα
dwˆl
> (<)0
dPα
dwˆl
> (<)0
dPα
dwˆl
> (<)0
dPα
dwˆl
≥ (<)0
When η is When η is When η is When η is
α > 1
dPα
dwˆl
> 0 sufficiently sufficiently sufficiently sufficiently
high (low) high (low) high (low) high (low)
dPα
dwˆl
> (<)0
dPα
dwˆl
> (<)0
dPα
dwˆl
> (<)0
dPα
dwˆl
> (<)0
that the P0 poverty measure focuses only on the numbers in poverty and not on
how poor the poor are, the gains to the incomes of poor working households
is not counted, and poverty (measured by the number in poverty) always rises.
The only reason that
dPα
dwˆl
= 0 (in Case 5) is that the poverty line is so high that
everybody is in poverty to begin with, and so no further increase in poverty is
possible.
The second set of results is for Case 1, i.e., the case in which the only poor
households are those for which both household members are unemployed.
Thus an increase in the minimum wage cannot possibly affect their incomes,
but their numbers will increase with the rise in unemployment. Thus, no matter
what the value of α, in this case, an increase in the minimum wage will increase
82
poverty, i.e.,
dPα
dwˆl
> 0.
The third set of results is for α ≥ 1 in Cases 2 through 5. In each of these
cells,
dPα
dwˆl
> 0 when η is sufficiently high and
dPα
dwˆl
< 0 when η is sufficiently low.
That is, when the elasticity of labor demand is greater than the critical value
corresponding to that particular case, as the minimum wage increases, poverty
will increase. Poverty will rise when the unemployment effect of a minimum
wage increase dominates the earnings effect. Of course, this is more likely the
greater the elasticity of demand for labor. On the other hand, when the elasticity
of labor demand is less than the critical value, as the minimum wage increases,
poverty will decrease: the earnings effect dominates the unemployment effect.
This completes our analysis of how poverty changes locally with the min-
imum wage within each of the five cases. Let us now analyze what happens
when changes in the minimum wage are so large that we move across cases.
3.4 The Poverty Effects of a Large Increase in the Minimum
Wage
Section 3.1 analyzed the effects of an infinitesimal increase in the minimum
wage. In this section, we ask what happens if the minimum is increased dis-
cretely. On the one hand, the discrete jump in the minimum wage can occur
within a case. When this happens, the effect of the minimum wage on poverty
is the integral of all the infinitesimal changes. No new analysis is needed when
this happens. On the other hand, the discrete jump in the minimum wage can
cause the economy to switch from one case to another. We show in this section
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that when such a switch occurs, the change in poverty may be discontinuous
and, moreover, may go in the opposite direction from what happens on either
side of the discontinuity.
3.4.1 Two Examples
It is possible to gain further insights by looking at specific numerical examples.
These examples will then be used to derive more general results.
The two examples we present are similar in most respects. They have the
same high wage wˆh = 15, the same employment at the high wage xh = 0.1, the
same range of possible minimum wages (from
wˆh
2
= 7.5 to wˆh = 15), the same
constant elasticity of demand for labor in the low wage sector η = 0.7, and the
same demand for labor curve in the low wage sector xl = 0.3 − 0.7lnwˆl. The two
examples differ in one important respect, however: in Example 1, the poverty
line z is in the range z <
wh
2
, while in Example 2, the poverty line z is in the range
z >
wh
2
. (Note: In Cases 1 and 2,z <
wh
2
, while in Cases 3 through 5, z >
wh
2
) For
the calculations below, z = 5 in Example 1 and z = 12.5 in Example 2.
To analyze how poverty as measured by Pα changes with
wˆl
z
our strategy is
to fix z and raise hatwl from the lowest possible value to the highest possible
value. We do this first when z <
wh
2
and then when z >
wh
2
.
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3.4.2 Analysis for the Poverty Headcount Ratio ( α = 0 )
We start with the situation where α is chosen to equal 0, i.e., the poverty measure
is the headcount ratio. The headcount ratio is sensitive only to the number of
people below the poverty line but not to the severity of their poverty. This
means that changing the minimum wage induces only an unemployment effect
but no earnings effect.
When Pα = 0, the unemployment effect operates in the same way in Cases
1 through 4: an increase in the minimum wage reduces employment in the low
wage sector, thereby increasing poverty as long as we remain within any of
these four cases. In Case 5, however, everyone is poor and remains so, and
therefore a change in the minimum wage has no effect on the poverty head-
count.
What happens within a case is not the same as what happens in moving from
one case to the next. To illustrate this point, consider Figures 3.1 and 3.2 .
Figure 1 graphs the poverty headcount ratio P0 in Example 1. We see that
P0 increases as the minimum wage rises within Case 2. However, there is a dis-
continuous fall in P0 at wˆl = 10. Why 10? Because that is twice the poverty line
(5 in Example 1), which is the boundary between Case 2 and Case 1. When the
minimum wage rises above 10, all of the people living in households with just
one member employed at the minimum wage suddenly escape from poverty.
We are now in the range of Case 1. In that range, a further increase of the mini-
mum wage decreases employment and therefore raises the poverty headcount.
This range ends just before the minimum wage equals the high wage, i.e., as
wˆl → wˆh?
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7.5                    10                                         15  w_hat 
   P0 
0.85 
0.8 
0.75 
0.7 
Figure 3.1: P0 as a function of wˆl in Example 1.
Suppose we continue to maintain that 0 <
wˆl
2
<
wh
2
< wˆl <
wˆl + wh
2
but now
z >
wh
2
. These conditions hold in Example 2. Figure 3.2 graphs the poverty head-
count ratio P0 in Example 2. The figure shows that as the minimum wage rises,
P0 is constant (at 1) in Case 5 and increases within Cases 4 and 3. It also shows
discontinuous drops at the boundaries of the Cases. The reason is analogous to
Example 1. At the boundary between Cases 5 and 4, all of the households with
the maximum possible earnings that is, those in which the adult is employed
in a high wage job and the youth in a low wage job suddenly escape poverty.
Similarly, at the boundary between Cases 4 and 3, those households in which
both the adult and the youth are employed in low wage jobs suddenly escape
poverty.
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   7.5                 10               12.5                 15  w_hat 
   P0 
     1 
0.995 
0.99 
0.985 
0.98 
0.975 
Figure 3.2: P0 as a function of wˆl in Example 2.
These examples illustrate results that are quite general:
Proposition 3.1 When 0 <
wˆl
2
<
wh
2
< wˆl <
wˆl + wh
2
and z >
wh
2
, an increase in the
minimum wage raises P0 within a case but may lower P0 if the economy crosses from
Case 2 to Case 1.
Proof: In Appendix C.2
Turning now to the case exemplified by Figure 3.2, we have the following
general result:
Proposition 3.2 When 0 <
wˆl
2
<
wh
2
< wˆl <
wˆl + wh
2
, an increase in the minimum
wage leaves P0 unchanged if the minimum wage remains within Case 5, raises P0 if
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the minimum wage remains within Case 4 or Case 3, and may lower P0if the economy
crosses from Case 5 to Case 4 or from Case 4 to Case 3.
Proof: In Appendix C.2.
This completes our analysis of how the poverty headcount ratio P0 varies
with the minimum wage wˆl. We turn now to the analysis of the situation where
poverty is measured by the squared poverty gap P2.
3.4.3 Analysis for the Squared Poverty Gap ( α = 2)
The squared poverty gap P2 is sensitive both to the number of people below the
poverty line and to the severity of their poverty. Changing the minimum wage
will induce both an unemployment effect and an earnings effect. As detailed in
Section 3.3, poverty as measured by P2 may increase or decrease depending on
the relative size of these two effects.
Figure 3.3 graphs the squared poverty gap P2 in Example 1. In this particular
example, as the minimum wage increases, P2 increases in both Cases 2 and 1.
This is not a general result: P2 could be increasing, decreasing, or change sign
within either of the two Cases. Figure 3.4 graphs the squared poverty gap P2
in Example 2. In this particular example, we have a U-shaped pattern: as the
minimum wage increases, P2 decreases in Case 5, decreases and then increases
in Case 4, and increases throughout Case 3. This U shape is not a general re-
sult: P2 could be decreasing throughout, increasing throughout, or change sign
depending on parameter values. The general result is:
Proposition 3.3 When 0 <
wˆl
2
<
wh
2
< wˆl <
wˆl + wh
2
, P2 is a continuous function of
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   7.5                 10               12.5                 15  w_hat 
   P2 
0.72 
0.7 
0.68 
0.66 
0.64 
0.62 
Figure 3.3: P2 as a function of wˆl in Example 1.
the minimum wage wˆl.
Proof: In Appendix C.2.
Although the behavior of P2 with respect to the minimum wage is continu-
ous, it can be non-monotonic, as shown in Figure 3.4 . This once again means
that local findings, whether theoretical or empirical, are not necessarily a good
guide to the implications of discrete changes. Thus, in Figure 3.4, while a small
increase in the minimum wage for low values of the wage may lower poverty,
a sufficiently large increase may have the opposite effect. On the other hand,
just because an increase in the minimum wage from a particular starting point
is observed to increase poverty is no guarantee that an increase in the minimum
wage will have the same effect as an increase in the minimum wage from some
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 0.76 
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0.758 
0.757 
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Figure 3.4: P2 as a function of wˆl in Example 2.
other starting point.
3.5 Conclusion
Fields and Kanbur (2007) brought the issue of income-sharing within the house-
hold to the forefront of the debate on the poverty impact of minimum wages.
That paper showed how this poverty impact depends crucially on the income-
sharing rule.
In this paper, the following model has been used. We have assumed equal
sharing within the household to highlight the importance of the household em-
ployment composition. Each household consists of one adult and one youth.
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There are two types of jobs, high wage jobs and low wage jobs. The minimum
wage applies to low wage jobs. Only adults may be hired for the high wage
jobs. Those adults not hired for the high wage jobs and all youth compete for
the low wage jobs. Of these, the ones not hired in the low wage jobs are unem-
ployed. This structure determines the employment composition of each house-
hold, which in turn determines its income. A household is poor if and only if its
per capita earnings are below a pre-established poverty line.
We showed that a minimum wage increase can raise poverty, lower poverty,
or leave poverty unchanged. The particular outcome depends on the specific
balance between the high wage, the low wage, employment in high-wage and
low-wage jobs, the elasticity of demand for labor with respect to the minimum
wage, and the value of α chosen.
Table 2 summarizes the patterns that arise depending on how high the
poverty line is and which value of α is chosen. The fifteen cells of Table 2 re-
flect what happens within a case. In addition, minimum wage changes may be
large enough to cause movements across cases. We proved three propositions
relating to movements across cases, showing that P0 necessarily changes dis-
continuously when crossing cases and that P2 necessarily changes continuously
when crossing cases. Furthermore, we demonstrated that there may be non-
monotonicities in the relationship, which means that local results - theoretical
or empirical - are not necessarily a good guide to the effects of discrete changes.
The results derived here reinforce the general conclusion from Fields and
Kanbur (2007) that no simple statement can be made about whether an increase
in the minimum wage raises poverty, lowers poverty, or leaves poverty un-
changed. A detailed analysis is needed before conclusions can be drawn. This
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strongly suggests that the nature of the policy debate should shift from the sim-
plistic “yes” versus “no” format that is current to a more nuanced discussion
of the precise conditions under which a minimum wage will or will not reduce
poverty.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1
A.1 Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 1.1 We show that L∗l ≥ L∗h for all a ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ k ≤ L¯ .
L∗l − L∗h =
A + k
4
− Aa
2a2 + 2
= (
A
4
− Aa
2a2 + 2
) +
k
4
=
A(a − 1)2
4(a2 + 1)
+
k
4
.
The first term in the RHS is always non-negative, which makes the overall ex-
pression always non-negative.
Proposition 1.2 Let’s find the range of k that gives us pi∗l ≤ pi∗h.
pi∗h − pi∗l =
a2A2
4(a2 + 1)
− (A + k)
2
8
≥ 0.
Rearranging this and solving for k, one gets A(
√
2a2
a2 + 1
− 1) ≥ k. That is, if k is
less than k¯(a) = A(
√
2a2
a2 + 1
− 1), then pi∗l ≤ pi∗h. Taking a derivative of k¯(a) with
respect to a, we get
dk¯
da
=
√
2A
(a2 + 1)3/2
, which is always greater than zero.
Proposition 1.3 Profit maximizing monopolist wage level is w∗l so when wˆ is
set at w∗l the firm will be yielding the maximum profit possible. Let’s now prove
that the profit function has a smooth concave shape with respect to wˆ. Note
here that we have to divide the range of wˆ into two: wˆ ≤ w
¯
and wˆ > w
¯
, where
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w
¯
=
A − 2k
3
, since the expression for firm’s profit is different for each. Let’s
suppose wˆ ≤ w
¯
: differentiating pic1 = (A − 2wˆ − k)(wˆ + k) with respect to wˆ,dpic1dwˆ =
−4wˆ− 3k + A, which is positive when wˆ ≤ A − 3k
4
and negative when wˆ ≥ A − 3k
4
.
Differentiating it again with respect to wˆ, we get −4, showing that it is indeed
a concave function with a maximum at wˆ = w∗l . When wˆ hits w¯
=
A − 2k
3
, we
now have pic2 to consider. Differentiating pic2 =
(A − wˆ)2
4
,
dpic2
dwˆ
= −A − wˆ
2
. This is
always negative since we know that A − wˆ ≥ 0.
The next step is to show that pic1(w¯
) ≥ pic2(w¯ ).
pic1(w¯
) =(A − 2w
¯
− k))(w
¯
+ k)
=(A − 2(A − 2k
3
) − k)(A − 2k
3
+ k)
=(
A + k
3
)2.
pic2(w¯
) =
(A −w
¯
)2
4
=
(A − A − 2k
3
)2
4
=(
A + k
3
)2.
Therefore pic1(w¯
) = pic2(w¯
). We have proved that pic is a decreasing continuous
function for wˆ ∈ [w∗l , A].
Proposition 1.5 In order to have pii ≥ pi∗h,
pii − pi∗h =
(A − δ + k)2
8
− a
2A2
4(a2 + 1)
≥ 0
Rearranging and solving for δ, we get
k − A(
√
2a2
a2 + 1
− 1) ≥ δ.
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Note here that the second term in the LHS is k¯(a) in proposition 3. That is, in
order to have pii ≥ pi∗h, δ has to be such that k − k¯(a) ≥ δ. We denote k − k¯(a) with
δ˜. Now let’s see how this cut-off value of δ changes with respect to a and k.
d(k − k¯(a))
dk
> 0.
d(k − k¯(a))
da
= −dk¯(a)
da
≤ 0.
Proposition 1.6 This proposition builds up on proposition 1.3. Let’s define
the function G(wˆ) as G(wˆ) = pic(wˆ) − pii. We know that dG(wˆ)dwˆ < 0 for wˆ ∈ [w
∗
l ,w
∗
h].
There are two cases to consider. The first case is when G(w∗h) ≤ 0 and the second
case is when G(w∗h) ≥ 0. Suppose G(w∗h) < 0. Then since G(w∗l ) =
(A + k)2
8
−
(A − δ + k)2
8
> 0 and G(w∗h) < 0, we know from the Intermediate Value Theorem
that there exists at least one solution w∗ for G(wˆ) = 0. For a strictly decreasing
function G(wˆ), the solution is unique. Suppose there are two solutions w∗1 and
w∗2 (where w
∗
1 < w
∗
2) for G(wˆ) = 0 such that G(w
∗
1) = 0 and G(w
∗
2) = 0. Since
G(wˆ) is a strictly decreasing function, it has to be that G(w∗1) > G(w
∗
2). This is
a contradiction. So there is a unique solution w∗. (Another proof can be done
using the Banach fixed point theorem.)
Suppose now that G(w∗h) ≥ 0. Then using the Intermediate Value Theorem,
we can see that for the range [w∗l , A], there exists a unique solution that gives us
G(wˆ) = 0 and that the solution w∗ will be satisfying w∗ > w∗h. This means that if
G(w∗h) ≥ 0, then there will be no w∗ that lies between [w∗l ,w∗h].
Therefore, we need the condition G(w∗h) ≤ 0 for the existence of the solution
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in the range [w∗l ,w
∗
h]. That is
G(w∗h) = pic(w
∗
h) − pii ≤ 0
=
(A − w∗h)2
4
− (A − δ + k)
2
8
≤ 0
Rearranging the terms with respect to δ, δ ≤ (1− √2(1− a
2(a2 + 1)
))A+ k or δ ≤ δ¯,
if we write (1− √2(1− a
2(a2 + 1)
))A+k as δ¯. Combining δ˜ ≥ δwith this expression,
we get δ ≤ min[δ¯, δ˜].
Proposition 1.7 When pii ≥ pic(w¯ ), similarly as in proposition 1.6 we have
shown a general uniqueness of the solution w∗, there will exist a unique w¯ such
that for wˆ satisfying w¯ ≤ wˆ, the firm will Comply. For w¯ ≥ wˆ the firm will Ignore.
The parameters, A, k, a, and δ, however, have to satisfy several conditions.
First, from solving for pii ≥ pih with respect to δ, we have shown in proposition
1.6 that δ has to satisfy δ˜ ≥ δ. Let’s now solve for pii ≥ pic(w¯ ).
pic(w¯
) − pii = (A + k)
2
9
− (A − δ + k)
2
8
≤ 0
δ ≤ (1 − 2
√
2
3
)(A + k).
In order to have a unique solution w¯, δ ≤ min[δ˜, (1 − 2
√
2
3
)(A + k)]. Now let’s
calculate what w¯ is. To have pic1 = pii,
pic1 − pii = (A − 2wˆ − k)(wˆ + k) − (A − δ + k)
2
8
= 0.
To simplify the problem, let’s suppose D = A+k and E = wˆ+k. Now the problem
becomes
(D − 2E)E − (D − δ)
2
8
= 0.
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Solving this with respect to E and plugging in the original expressions for E and
D, we get
E − D
4
= −
√
δ(2A + 2k − δ)
4
wˆ =
A − 3k
4
−
√
δ(2A + 2k − δ)
4
,
or
E − D
4
=
√
δ(2A + 2k − δ)
4
wˆ =
A − 3k
4
+
√
δ(2A + 2k − δ)
4
.
Note here that the first solution cannot hold since
A − 3k
4
−
√
δ(2A + 2k − δ)
4
≤
A + k
4
= w∗l < wˆ by assumption. Therefore the solution w¯ to pic1 = pii becomes
A − 3k
4
+
√
δ(2A + 2k − δ)
4
.
Proposition 1.8 Differentiating w¯ with respect to k, we have
dw¯
dk
=
−3
4
+
δ/4
√
δ(2A + 2k − δ)−1. By assumption of proposition 1.7, δ˜ ≥ δ, i.e., k − k¯ ≥ δ, and
since k¯ > 0, we have 2A + 2(k − δ) > 0 and therefore 2A + 2k − δ > δ. Then we can
conclude that the above equation has to satisfy
dw¯
dk
=
−3
4
+
δ
4
√
δ(2A + 2k − δ) ≤ −3
4
+
δ2
4
.
Since
−3
4
+
δ2
4
< 0 for all δ ∈ [0, 1], we know that dw¯
dk
< 0. Now, differentiating w¯
with respect to δ we have
dw¯
dδ
= 1/8
√
δ(2A + 2k − δ)−1(2A + 2k − 2δ).
This expression is always positive because as we have shown above, 2A + 2k −
2δ > 0.
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Proposition 1.9 When 0 < pii ≤ pic(w¯ ), since pic(w¯ ) is a decreasing function,
G(w
¯
) > 0. We also know that G(A) = 0. Similarly as in the proof of propo-
sition1.6, we can show that there will exist a unique w˜ > w
¯
such that for wˆ
satisfying w˜ ≤ wˆ the firm will Comply. For w˜ ≥ wˆ, the firm will Ignore. In order
to have that w˜ lie in [w∗l ,w
∗
h], as we have done it in proposition 1.6, we have to
restrict the δ so that G(w∗h) ≤ 0. So we have the pre-condition for proposition
1.9, δ ≤ min[δ¯, δ˜]. Given this, we know there exists a cut-off. Let’s now calculate
what it is.
Solving for pii ≤ pic(w¯ ),
pic(w¯
) − pii = (A + k)
2
9
− (A − δ + k)
2
8
≥ 0
δ ≥ (1 − 2
√
2
3
)(A + k).
In order to have a unique solution w˜, δ ≤ min[δ¯, δ˜] and δ ≥ (1− 2
√
2
3
)(A+ k). Let’s
now get the value of δ˜.
In order to have pic2 = pii,
pic2 − pii = (A − wˆ)
2
4
− (A − δ + k)
2
8
= 0.
Rearranging and solving for wˆ, we get:
(
√
2 − 1)A + δ − k√
2
= wˆ.
Therefore, the solution to pic2 = pii is w˜ =
(
√
2 − 1)A + δ − k√
2
.
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Proposition 1.10 Differentiating
(
√
2 − 1)A + δ − k√
2
= w˜ with respect to k,
dw˜
dk
= − 1√
2
< 0. Differentiating w˜ with respect to δ we have
dw˜
dδ
=
1√
2
> 0.
Differentiating
(
√
2 − 1)A + δ − k√
2
= w˜ with respect to k,
dw˜
dk
= − 1√
2
< 0. Differ-
entiating w˜ with respect to δ we have
dw˜
dδ
=
1√
2
> 0.
Proposition 1.11 The complete proof is omitted because it is similar to the
proof of proposition 1.6. There is one condition that a has to satisfy −4a3 + 5a2 −
4a + 4 ≤ 0. This condition corresponds to δ ≤ δ¯ in proposition 1.6. We want
pic(w∗h) − pih(w∗h) ≤ 0 to guarantee the existence of a cut-off w∗ that lies between
w∗ ∈ [w∗l ,w∗h].
Let’s start from pic(w∗h) − pih(w∗h) ≤ 0. For this to be true,
pic(w∗h) − pih(w∗h) =
(A − Aa
2(a2 + 1)
)2
4
− A
2a2
4(a2 + 1)
≤ 0
Rearranging the terms with respect to a we get −4a3 +5a2−4a+4 ≤ 0. That is, for
there to be a unique cutoff, a has to satisfy the condition −4a3 + 5a2 − 4a+ 4 ≤ 0..
If −4a3 + 5a2 − 4a + 4 ≥ 0, then for all wˆ∗ ∈ [w∗l ,w∗h], the firm will Comply.
Proposition 1.12 When pih ≥ pic(w¯ ), similarly as in the proposition we have
shown a general uniqueness of the solution w∗, there will exist a unique wˇ such
that for wˆ satisfying wˇ ≤ wˆ the firm will Comply. For wˇ ≥ wˆ the firm will Move.
The parameters, A, k, a, and δ, however, have to satisfy several conditions. First,
from solving for pii ≤ pih with respect to δ, we have shown in proposition 1.6 that
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δ has to satisfy δ˜ ≤ δ. Let’s now solve for pih ≥ pic(w¯ ).
pic(w¯
) − pih = (A + k)
2
9
− (Aa)
2
4(a2 + 1)
≤ 0
k ≤ A( 3a
2
√
a2 + 1
− 1).
So in order to have a unique solution wˇ, δ˜ ≤ δ and k ≤ A( 3a
2
√
a2 + 1
− 1).
Now let’s calculate what wˇ is. To have pic1 = pih ,
pic1 − pih = (A − 2wˆ − k)(wˆ + k) − a
2A2
4(a2 + 1)
= 0.
To simplify the problem, let’s suppose D = A+k and E = wˆ+k. Now the problem
becomes
(D − 2E)E − a
2A2
4(a2 + 1)
= 0.
Solving this with respect to E and plugging in the original expressions for E and
D, we get:
E − D
4
= −
√
D2
16
− a
2A2
8(a2 + 1)
wˆ =
A − 3k
4
−
√
(A + k)2
16
− a
2A2
8(a2 + 1)
or
E − D
4
=
√
D2
16
− a
2A2
8(a2 + 1)
wˆ =
A − 3k
4
+
√
(A + k)2
16
− a
2A2
8(a2 + 1)
.
Note here that the first solution cannot hold since
A − 3k
4
−
√
(A + k)2
16
− a
2A2
8(a2 + 1)
≤
A + k
4
= w∗l < wˆ by assumption. The solution wˇ to pic1 = pih can be calculated as
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A − 3k
4
+
√
(A + k)2
16
− a
2A2
8(a2 + 1)
.
Proposition 1.13 Differentiating wˇ =
A − 3k
4
+
√
(A + k)2
16
− a
2A2
8(a2 + 1)
with
respect to k:
dwˇ
dk
= − 3
4
+
1
16
(A + k)(
√
(A + k)2
16
− a
2A2
8(a2 + 1)
)−1
= − 3
4
+
1
16
(
√
1
16
− a
2A2
8(a2 + 1)(A + k)2
)−1
≥ − 3
4
+
1
16
12 = 0.
The last line comes from using
(A + k)2
9
− (Aa)
2
4(a2 + 1)
≤ 0 (the fact that pih ≥ pic(w¯ )).
So
dwˇ
dk
> 0. Now, differentiating wˇ with respect to a we have
dwˇ
da
=
−aA2
8
√
(A + k)2
16
− a
2A2
8(a2 + 1)
< 0.
Proposition 1.14 When pih ≤ pic(w¯ ), similarly as in the other propositions
where we have shown a general uniqueness of the cut-off w∗, there will exist a
unique w˙ such that for wˆ satisfying w˙ ≤ wˆ the firm will Comply. For w˙ ≥ wˆ the
firm will Move.
The parameters, A, k, a, and δ, however, have to satisfy several conditions.
First, from solving for pii ≤ pih with respect to δ, we have shown in proposition
1.6 that δ has to satisfy δ˜ ≤ δ. Let’s now solve for pih ≤ pic(w¯ ).
pic(w¯
) − pih = (A + k)
2
9
− (Aa)
2
4(a2 + 1)
≥ 0
k ≥ A( 3a
2
√
a2 + 1
− 1).
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So in order to have a unique solution wˇ, δ˜ ≤ δ and k ≥ A( 3a
2
√
a2 + 1
− 1). In order
to have pic2 = pih,
pic2 − pih = (A − wˆ)
2
4
− a
2A2
4(a2 + 1)
= 0.
Rearranging and solving for wˆ, we get wˆ = A − Aa√
a2 + 1
. Therefore, the solution
to pic2 = pih, w˙ = A − Aa√
a2 + 1
.
Proposition 1.15 Differentiating w˙ with respect to a we have
dw˙
da
= −A(a2 +
1)−5/2 < 0.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
B.1 Game Theoretic Exposition
In the next two subsections, I provide a two stage game theoretical model of
coalition formation of interest groups. A movement organization demonstrates
for a claim. Given the salience of the claim and the effort level of the organiza-
tion, the decision maker determines the extent to which it will respond to the
demands.
B.1.1 Outline of the Model
Let’s first start with two risk neutral social movement organizations (SMOs).
The general structure of the framework is as follows. Each organization - 1 and
2 - has a specific “claim” or a discrete {0, 1} public good it would like to obtain
from the decision maker.1 Slightly abusing notation, we denote the goods as 1
and 2. This good is public in the sense that its provision affects everyone equally
within an organization. In sum, organization j, where j = 1, 2, demonstrates for
public good j.
The extent to which the claims of SMO 1 and 2 overlap is b ∈ (−1, 1), a mea-
sure of how much an organization discounts the public good promoted by the
other. When public good 1 (2) is provided, participants in organization 1 (2)
receive a payoff of 1 when those in 2 (1) receive b. When b is close to 1, you
1Legislations such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 could be one example of such public good.
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get satisfaction from other organization’s public good as if it were yours. The
relationship between a movement organization and a countermovement orga-
nization can be described with b being close to −1. When b = 0, provision of
public good 2 (1) does not affect organization 1 (2). I assume that both have
the same perception of how much their claims overlap; b is the same across or-
ganizations.2 There are several benefits of having an overlap parameter rather
than specifying policy positions as in the public choice literature. First of all,
claims of movement organization is multidimensional. Second, they are con-
cerned with the differences rather than the actual positions of the claims when
making a decision to cooperate.
An organization or an organizational claim faces a political opportunity -
a j ∈ [0, 1] - at a specific time period. One can think of the political opportunity
as the salience of the claim or the receptiveness of the decision maker. Given
the political opportunity, organization j decides on the effort level 0 ≤ e j ≤
e¯ j to put in to the movement, where e¯ j is the maximum effort level possible.3
A convex cost function of j, c j(e j), reflects the internal resources available to
the organization. The functional form of the cost function may differ across
organizations.
In sum, a movement organization j can be characterized by a political oppor-
tunity a j and its cost function c j(e j). The relationship between the the two - the
overlap of their claims - is b. I assume that there exists a single representative
participant so that I do not have to worry about the free-rider problem.4 I also
2This does not have to be necessarily true - there could be situations where each organization
has different assessments on how much their interests overlap.
3Limiting the effort level at e¯ j is convenient as much as it is realistic. This can guarantee
existence of a solution when we actually solve the model.
4Even though we have a single representative player for every organization, the model can
not be considered as one that studies individual level cooperation. A single individual will not
be faced with a ‘political opportunity’.
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assume that the SMO membership is fixed and an individual cannot participate
in more than one organization.
When there is no movement (or movement organization) protesting, no pub-
lic good is provided. When there is a single movement by one SMO, the decision
maker provides the good with probability 1. When a coalition of two organi-
zations is formed and they protest together as a group, the decision maker is
ambivalent between the two goods.
When there are two separate protests, probability of provision is based on
the relative salience of the claims and the effort levels: the probability that good
j will be provided can be written as P j(e1, e2; a1, a2). I assume that P j is a con-
cave function of e j and a j : if organization j increase its effort, the probability
that j will be provided increases at a decreasing rate. When political opportu-
nity opens up for j, again, the probability that j will be provided increases at a
decreasing rate.
1 and 2 play a two stage exclusive membership game where coalitions are
formed by all the players who have announced the same coalition. When a
member leaves the coalition, it assumes that all other members stay where they
are.5 I describe this game in a partition function form (Carraro, 2003, p. 47).
Let’s first go over the notations. A coalition pi ∈ Π is a partition of the set
N = {1..N} of players, where pi = {C1,C2, ..Ci..,CM} is a set of all coalitions formed.
Every player has to belong to a coalition,
⋃M
i=1 Ci = N, and no player belongs to
two coalitions:Ci
⋂
Ci′ = ∅. The partition function associates each coalition Ci
in a coalition pi a worth v(Ci, pi). Assuming that formed coalitions compete in
a noncooperative way, the partition function would be the Nash equilibrium
5This is the game ∆ in Hart and Kurz (1983).
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payoff of the game played by the coalitions. Suppose j belongs to coalition Ci :
j ∈ Ci. Let s∗ be a vector of strategies, where the strategy set for j is written as
S j = {e j : Ci → [0, e¯ j]} and strategy s j ∈ S j. If for allCi ∈ pi and for all sCi ∈ × j∈CiS j,∑
j∈Ci u j(s
∗
Ci , s
∗
N/Ci
) ≥ ∑ j∈Ci u j(sCi , s∗N/Ci), then we can define the partition function as
v(Ci, pi) =
∑
j∈Ci u j(s
∗). For convenience, I also denote v j(Ci, pi) = u j(s∗) as the Nash
equilibrium payoff of j being in coalition Ci.
In the first stage coalition is formed. There are two coalition s possible :
pi1 = {{1}, {2}} and pi2 = {{1, 2}}. When 1 and 2 decide to compete, it is the same
as having two separate movements or two singleton coalitions pi1 = {{1}, {2}}.
When they decide to cooperate, pi2 = {{1, 2}} is formed. In the second stage
organizations decide on the optimal effort level given the coalition .
Let’s first calculate the partition function for pi1 = {{1}, {2}} when organiza-
tions remain separate. The maximization problem of organization 1 is:
max
0≤e1≤e¯1
u1(e1, e2) = P1 + bP2 − c1(e1). (B.1)
Similarly, the maximization problem of organization 2 is:
max
0≤e2≤e¯2
u2(e1, e2) = bP1 + P2 − c2(e2). (B.2)
Recall that P j(e1, e2; a1, a2) is the probability of the actual provision of j. Let’s
examine 1’s maximization problem (B.1). The first term in the right hand side
of the equation is the expected payoff of 1 from receiving its own public good
1. The second term is the expected payoff from public good 2 discounted by
b. The third term is the cost incurred from putting in an effort level of e1 to the
movement. Solutions of these maximization problems exist6 and we note them
6The objective function u j is a continuous and concave function and the set of e j is a
nonempty, compact and convex set - we know that solution exists. Refer to theorem 4.1 (Eich-
berger, 1993, p. 90).
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as e∗1 and e
∗
2. Corresponding partition functions are v({1}, pi1) = u1(e∗1, e∗2), and
v({2}, pi1) = u2(e∗1, e∗2).
Let’s now get the partition function for pi2 = {{1, 2}} when two organizations
come together and build a coalition. v({1, 2}, pi2) will be the sum of their max-
imum payoffs, which will be obtained by 1 solving the below maximization
problem:
max
0≤e1≤e¯1
u1(e1, e2) + u2(e1 + e2) =P1 + bP2 − c1(e1)
+ bP1 + P2 − c2(e2). (B.3)
and 2 solving the following maximization problem:
max
0≤e2≤e¯2
u2(e1, e2) =P1 + bP2 − c1(e1)
+ bP1 + P2 − c2(e2). (B.4)
Here, note that P1 = P2 = 1/2 since both organizations are in a coalition
and the decision maker is indifferent. Let’s examine 1’s maximization problem
(B.3). The first bracket in the right hand side of equation is the expected payoff
of organization 1 when exerting e1 and the second bracket is that of organization
2 when it exerts e2. Organization 1 maximizes the aggregated expected payoff of
both organizations. Solving this maximization problem, we denote the solutions
as e∗∗1 , and e
∗∗
2 . We then get the partition functions as v({1, 2}, pi2) = u1(e∗∗1 , e∗∗2 ) +
u2(e∗∗1 , e
∗∗
2 ). Here, the payoffs of organization 1 and 2 in belonging in the grand
coalition are v1({1, 2}, pi2) = u1(e∗∗1 , e∗∗2 ) and v1({1, 2}, pi2) = u1(e∗∗1 , e∗∗2 ).
Let’s now see what coalitional can be supported as a Nash Equilibrium Out-
come. For notational convenience, I omit the coalition that each individual be-
long to - specifying the coalitional structure will be sufficient. pi1 = {{1}, {2}} is
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a trivial nash equilibrium outcome: when an organization decides to be inde-
pendent, the other organization’s best response would be to be independent as
well. The coalition pi2 = {{1, 2}} is a nash equilibrium outcome if and only if
v2(pi2) ≥ v2(pi1) and v1(pi2) ≥ v1(pi1):given that the other wants to cooperate, orga-
nization will cooperate only when the payoff is greater in the grand coalition
case.7 In the next subsection I solve for a two organization case with a specific
provision function P j.
B.1.2 Coalition Formation Example
There are two organizations with different political opportunities a1 and a2,
where a1 < a2 and a1 + a2 = 1. They have the same linear cost function
c1(e) = c2(e) = ce with an overlap of their claims b. At stage 1, organizations
build coalition. At stage 2, depending on the coalition formation, they decide
on their effort level. Suppose there exists a minimum effort level e0 = 1 in or-
der to participate in a protest. Then the effort that organization j will exert
will be 1 + e j. When the two groups protest, the probability that good j will be
provided by the decision maker is: P j(e1, e2; a1, a2) =
(1 + e j)a j
(1 + e1)a1 + (1 + e2)a2
, for
j = 1, 2.8 For simplicity, let’s assume the maximum effort possible in addition to
the minimum amount 1 is e¯1 = e¯2 = 1.
In stage one, organizations simultaneously decide whether to cooperate or
to compete. There are two coalition structure possible: pi1 = {{1}, {2}} and
pi2 = {{1, 2}}. Let’s get the partition function for pi1 = {{1}, {2}}. Organization
7One can use the Strong Nash Equilibrium concept devised by Aumann (1959) to find out
when pi2 dominates pi1.
8This can be thought of as there being an effectiveness function ψ(e j, a j) = (e j + 1)a j and
the decision maker linearly weighting the two organizations (Esteban and Ray, 2006). This
formulation follows the rent-seeking literature.
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1’s maximization problem is
max
0≤e1≤1
u1(e1, e2) =
(e1 + 1)a1
(e1 + 1)a1 + (e2 + 1)a2
+ b
(e2 + 1)a2
(e1 + 1)a1 + (e2 + 1)a2
− c(e1 + 1). (B.5)
Organization 2’s maximization problem is
max
0≤e2≤1
u2(e1, e2) =
(e2 + 1)a2
(e1 + 1)a1 + (e2 + 1)a2
+ b
(e1 + 1)a1
(e1 + 1)a1 + (e2 + 1)a2
− c(e2 + 1). (B.6)
The solution of the above maximization problem (e∗1) and (e
∗
2) are:
e∗1 = e
∗
2 =

0, if b > 1 − c
a1a2
;
(1 − b)a1a2
c
− 1, if 1 − 2c
a1a2
≤ b ≤ 1 − c
a1a2
;
1, if b < 1 − 2c
a1a2
.
Studying the solution of the maximization problem (B.5), several proposi-
tions can be made.
Proposition B.1 As organization i increases e∗i , protest j will match it by increasing
e∗j.
Let’s just focus on the interior solutions. When we solve the maximization prob-
lem (B.5), we get the first order condition
a1a2(e∗2 + 1)
(a1(e∗1 + 1) + a2(e
∗
2 + 1))
2 = c. Solving
for (B.6), we get
a1a2(e∗1 + 1)
(a1(e∗1 + 1) + a2(e
∗
2 + 1))
2 = c. Therefore, at the equilibrium,
e∗1 = e
∗
2.
This is consistent with Tarrow’s observation (Tarrow, 1989, p. 186) that when
there exists an external group or an organization, disruptiveness of protest
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events increase. Because of the specific provision rule and the identical cost
function we impose in this example, regardless of the value of b both organi-
zations will exert the same amount of effort. As organization 1 increases e∗1 to
increase its effectiveness, protest 2 will match it by increasing e∗2, and vice versa.
Proposition B.2 There exists b and b such that (i) b > b organizations put in zero
extra effort and (ii) b < b organizations put in its maximum effort possible.
When b is sufficiently high, it has no need to put in much effort since even if
the other public good is provided it will have a similar effect as if were its own
good. When b is sufficiently low, the other’s gain hurts the organization’s payoff
so it is better to exert maximum effort in competing.
Proposition B.3 As two interests overlap more (b increases), the equilibrium effort
level e∗1 and e
∗
2 both decrease.
Differentiating e∗1 and e
∗
2 with respect to b, we get
∂e∗1
∂b
= − a1a2
c(a1 + a2)2
< 0 and
∂e∗2
∂b
= − a1a2
c(a1 + a2)2
< 0. Therefore, as two interests overlap more (b increases),
the equilibrium effort level e∗1 and e
∗
2 both decrease. Also, when b decreases, e
∗
1
and e∗2 both increase. Even if the other public good is provided, it will benefit
you more as b increases and there is no need to fight to get your own good.
Proposition B.4 As the political opportunity of organization 2 (a2) becomes greater,
the optimal effort level e∗2 and e
∗
1 both decrease.
Taking a derivative of e∗1 and e
∗
2 with respect to a2, we get
∂e∗1
∂a2
=
∂e∗2
∂a2
=
a1(1 − b) a1 − a2c(a1 + a2)3 < 0, for all a1 < a2. Therefore as the political opportunity
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of organization 2 (a2) becomes greater, the optimal effort level e∗2 and e
∗
1 both
decrease.
When the political opportunity of 2 (that had greater political opportunity
than 1 to begin with) increases, it will put less effort than before. What should 1
do then? 1 will also spend less time in participating in the protest since protest 2
has become more effective and the probability of 1 getting its own public good
goes down: it is better for organization 1 to save the cost by decreasing the
effort.
Proposition B.5 As the political opportunity of organization 1 (a1) becomes greater,
the optimal effort level e∗1 and e
∗
2 both increase.
Taking a derivative of e∗1 and e
∗
2 with respect to a1, we get
∂e∗1
∂a1
=
∂e∗2
∂a1
=
a2(1 − b) a2 − a1c(a1 + a2)3 > 0, for all a1 < a2. Therefore as the political opportunity
of organization 1 (a1) becomes greater, the optimal effort level e∗2 and e
∗
1 both
increase.
When the political opportunity of organization 1 (that had less political op-
portunity than 2 to begin with) increases, it will put more effort than before.
The reasoning behind this is that as the support of the claim increases for the
less favored organization, it is worthwhile for it to grasp the chance and put
more resources into the protest. As organization 1 puts in more resources, orga-
nization 2 will put more resources as well to match up.
To calculate the partition function for pi1 = {{1}, {2}}, we plug in e∗1 and e∗2 to
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the functions u1 and u2.
v1(pi1) = u1(e∗1) =

−c + b + (1 − b)a1, if b > 1 − ca1a2 ;
b + (1 − b)(a1)2, if 1 − 2ca1a2 ≤ b ≤ 1 −
c
a1a2
;
−2c + b + (1 − b)a1 if b < 1 − 2ca1a2 .
v2(pi1) = u2(e∗2) =

−c + b + (1 − b)a2, if b > 1 − ca1a2 ;
+b + (1 − b)(a2)2, if 1 − 2ca1a2 ≤ b ≤ 1 −
c
a1a2
;
−2c + b + (1 − b)a2 if b < 1 − 2ca1a2 .
Now let’s get the partition function for pi2 = {{1, 2}}. This is when the two or-
ganizations come together and build a solidarity protest. Given such coalition,
the time e1 (e2) organization 1 (2) put into the protest work towards the other
public good 2 (1) as well. Given the provision rule we impose, the decision
maker will provide the goods with the same probability: P1 = P2 = 1/2 for all
e1, e2, and a1 and a2. 1 chooses 0 ≤ e1 ≤ 1 to maximize the utility:
max
0≤e1≤1
u1(e1) + u2(e2) = P1 + bP2 − c1(e1)
+ bP1 + P2 − c2(e2)
= 1 + b − c(e1 + 1) − c2(e2) (B.7)
And 2 chooses 0 ≤ e2 ≤ 1 to maximize the utility:
max
0≤e2≤1
u1(e1) + u2(e2) = P1 + bP2 − c1(e1)
+ bP1 + P2 − c2(e2)
= 1 + b − c(e1 + 1) − c2(e2). (B.8)
Solving this optimization problem we see that the extra effort e∗∗1 = e
∗∗
2 = 0. This
is because
1
2
of probability of provision is guaranteed given that there are only
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two organizations and both are cooperating. The partition function becomes
v({1, 2}, pi2) = u1(e∗∗1 , e∗∗2 ) + u2(e∗∗1 , e∗∗2 ) = 1 + b − 2c, for all overlap b and political
opportunities a1 and a2.
Comparing the partition functions it is possible to determine when each
coalition structure can be supported as a nash equilibrium. pi1 is a trivial equi-
librium outcome since when one organization declares a singleton coalition the
best response of the other organization will be also declaring a singleton coali-
tion.
Proposition B.6 There exist a˜, â, b˜, and b̂ such that for a˜2 ≤ a ≤ â and for b˜ ≤ b ≤ b̂
the grand coalition is supported as a nash equilibrium.
First, comparing v1(pi2) and v1(pi1), one can see that 1 will always prefer coalition
pi2 (the grand coalition) regardless of a1, a2, and b (as long as a2 > a1). 2, however,
will want to be in the grand coalition if and only if a2 ≤
√
5 + 1
2
a1 and (−12 − c +
(
a2
a1 + a2
))(−1
2
+ (
a2
a1 + a2
))−1 ≤ b ≤ 1 − 2c(a1 + a2)2(a22 − 2a1a2 − a12)−1. When such
conditions do not hold, pi1 will be the only coalition structure arising.
In other words, pi2 can be supported as a nash equilibrium outcome if and
only if a1 ≤ a2 ≤
√
5 + 1
2
a1 and (−12−c+(
a2
a1 + a2
))(−1
2
+(
a2
a1 + a2
))−1 ≤ b ≤ 1−2c(a1+
a2)2(a22 − 2a1a2 − a12)−1. Only when the political opportunity of organization 1 is
comparable, and when the overlap b is not too low or not too high, cooperation
will occur. When b is too low (b < b˜), the saved resources from not having
to compete does not make up for the loss incurred by having to tolerate the
materialization of the goals of the other group. When the overlap is high enough
(b > b̂), the cost of coalition - the compromise of one’s own goals - is greater
than the benefit of coalition - the saved resources from not having to compete.
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This is because with b so high, organizations will not be exerting much effort in
competing with one another in the first place.
Proposition B.7 The range of b that results in the grand coalition depends on a1 and
a2. More specifically, as a2 goes up, the lower bound b˜ for the grand coalition goes up
and the upper bound b̂ goes down.
Here, taking a derivative of b˜ and b̂ with respective to a2,
∂˜b
∂a2
= c(−1
2
+
(
a2
a1 + a2
))−2 > 0 and
∂̂b
∂a2
= −16c(a1 + a2)a1a2(a22 − 2a1a2 − a21)−2 < 0. As a2 goes up,
the lower bound b˜ for the grand coalition goes up and the upper bound b̂ goes
down.
The range of claims overlap that allows for coalition to form is a function of
the political opportunities for both organizations. As 2’s political opportunity
increases, the set of bs will contract and a coalition will be less likely to form.
In B.3, I provide an extension of the model with three players. Through a
simplified example, I demonstrate that when there are three organizations 1, 2,
3, with different political opportunities and claims, despite 2’s closeness to 1 in
policy position, 2 may prefer to build coalition with 3 rather than 1 if 3 has a
greater political opportunity than 1.
B.2 Discussion - The Two Labor Unions Case
NLU and EGLU protested against the E-land group, a firm infamous for its
oppression against union activities. The unions represented distinct groups of
people with specific and different claims. For EGLU, the focus of the strike was
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on non-regular employment, demanding the rehiring of the fired workers in
the first and second quarters of 2007 and employment guarantee of non-regular
workers of 18 months or more. For NLU, regular worker issues were its imme-
diate concerns. In December 2006, after introducing the PDA (personal digital
assistant) system in the cash register area, the firm transferred cashiers with
regular contracts to other sections or branches (which would require relocation)
without the union’s consent and started to outsource those jobs. Rumors about
selling the most profitable Kang-nam branch of Newcore was another point of
dispute. This meant that over a thousand workers would inevitably face re-
structuring.
Despite the diverging claims (captured by the parameter “b < 1”), the dif-
ferent levels of political opportunities or issue salience “a” faced by each union
encouraged the coalition to form. The E-land Group was unwilling to relent on
the demands of both organizations, which induced the strikers to turn to exter-
nal support to force the firm out to the negotiation table. The extent of public
support for each union can be conceptualized as political opportunity or issue
salience.
With the passage of the Non-regular Workers Protection Act and its mem-
bership based on the socially neglected, the EGLU drew great attention and
sympathy from the public. Having a less salient agenda, aNLU < aEGLU , NLU
had an incentive to work with the EGLU. By framing its goals in terms of non-
regular workers issues and forming a coalition with EGLU that was gaining
leverage, the NLU no longer had to exert extraneous effort in attracting public’s
support. NLU, mostly consisted of young regular workers with better work-
ing conditions than the non-regulars, benefited from such identity and claims
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alignment.
On the other hand, EGLU had agreed to join forces with the NLU be-
cause there was a certain level of commonality between their claims (b was big
enough). Moreover, the difference in the level of political opportunities was not
as significant once the NLU framed their issues in line with the EGLU. If they
stay independent, in case of comparable political opportunities, each has to put
in resources to compete over public support in order to achieve their goals. Such
rent seeking behavior was demonstrated in proposition B.5. By forming a coali-
tion they could concentrate on fighting against the opponent - the E-land Group
- rather than with each other.
Once the negotiations began, however, public support played a lesser role
in the progression. The firm explicitly favored NLU over EGLU because it was
cheaper in the long run for them to court the regular workers. Moreover, The
overlap of claims shrank as well when NLU started to compromise their initial
positions on non-regular issues and focused more on regular ones. Even though
their claims no longer overlapped much, as a less favored union EGLU wanted
to work together with the NLU. Not surprisingly, NLU declined. Note here that
I have not made use of the differences in cost structure or transfer of resources
in predicting the coalition patterns. The outcomes of this model are robust to
such specifications.
B.3 Three Organization Coalition Example
Now we add in one more SMO into the framework. There are three SMOs,
1, 2, and 3, with different levels of political opportunities a1 ≤ a2 ≤ a3 and
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cost functions c1(e1), c2(e2), and c3(e3). Again, cost function c j(e j) are convex
functions of effort e j that organization j puts in. For simplification of the anal-
ysis, let’s suppose a1 = 0, a2 = a2, and a3 = 1 and cost functions are identical,
c1(e) = c2(e) = c3(e) = ce.
Let’s suppose the overlap of claims of group 1 and 2 is b12 = b21, 2 and 3,
b23 = b32, 3 and 1, b31 = b13.9 For this exercise I assume that b23 = b32 = b31 = b13 =
d, b12 = b21 = b, and b > d. That is, organization 1 and 2 has overlap of claims
of b, when 1 and 3, and 2 and 3 has overlap of d: The two weaker organizations
have more commonality with each other than with the strongest organization.
As the previous example, I suppose that the minimum effort level to par-
ticipate in the movement is 1. The effort that organization j will exert then
will be 1 + e j. I also assume that the maximum extra effort j can put in is 1.
The government provides each public good weighting the combination of polit-
ical opportunity and the effort as follows: P j(e1, e2, e3; a1, a2, a3) =
(1 + e j)a j∑3
j=1(1 + e j)a j
.
When two or three organizations build coalition, the new political opportu-
nity becomes identical with the greatest political opportunity in the coalition
C: ac = max(a j∈C).
Possible coalitional structures that can form at Stage 1 are as follows: pi1 =
{{1}, {2}, {3}}, pi2 = {{1, 2}, {3}}, pi3 = {{2, 3}, {1}}, pi4 = {{3, 1}, {2}}, and pi5 = {{1, 2, 3}}.
At stage two, given the coalitional structure, organization j, where j = 1, 2, 3,
decides how much effort - e j - to put in to the movement. The characteristic
function v is associated with each coalition is written as v(Ci, pi), where Ci is a
coalition in the coalition structure pi. As before, for notational convenience, I
9Having the extent of overlap as three independent parameters can be justified. Suppose
there are three organizations: a pro-choice group, a women’s rights group, and a civil rights
group. Then pro-choice and women’s rights have an overlap, and civil rights and women’s
rights have an overlap but pro-choice and civil rights does not have an overlap.
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write payoff of j ∈ Ci that belongs to pi, as v j(pi).
Rather than solving for nash equilibria outcome for all cases, let’s focus on
a specific question: when will the two weak organizations (1 and 2) that have a
greater overlap of claims build coalition against the more effective organization
(3) and when will one of the two build coalition with 3?10 That is, in what
situations is pi3 = {{2, 3}, {1}} or pi4 = {{3, 1}, {2}} more likely to occur than pi2 =
{{1, 2}, {3}}?
Let’s first compare between coalition structures pi3 = {{2, 3}, {1}} and pi4 =
{{3, 1}, {2}}.11
Proposition B.8 If pi3 and pi4 both are nash equilibrium outcomes, pi3 = {{2, 3}, {1}}
will be always preferred to pi4 = {{3, 1}, {2}} by 3.
For 3, organizations 1 and 2 can be distinguished only by their political oppor-
tunities since the claims difference is equally d. 3 will get a half of v({2, 3}, pi3) or
v({3, 1}, pi4) and it will prefer the coalition that results in a higher pay-off. Since
1’s political opportunity is lower than 2, competing against 1 will yield a higher
payoff than competing against 2. Therefore it will prefer pi3 over pi4 in any case.
Now let’s compare coalition structures pi2 and pi3.
Proposition B.9 If pi2 and pi3 are nash equilibrium outcomes, for a sufficiently high a2
and for a range of d < d < d¯, 3 will want to build coalition with 2 and therefore prefer
pi2 over pi3.
10Since we are controlling for the cost function an organization with a higher political oppor-
tunity structure will be more effective.
11Remember that this is an exclusive membership game where coalition is built only when all
the members within it agree.
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From the point of view of 3, choosing between pi2 and pi3 will be similar to choos-
ing cooperation or competition with 2 in a two player situation. To 3, coalition
of 1 and 2 is basically identical to 2. Even though it will be competing against a
joint effort by 1 and 2, this will be undistinguishable from the case when it com-
petes against 2 only: the claims difference of 3 and 1 and 3 and 2 are equally d
and 1 and 2 have the same cost structure and political opportunity a2 once in the
coalition {1, 2}. Given that we have assumed a1 to be equal to zero, for coalition
structure pi3, the probability that 1 will get its public good is equal to zero. Then
the government will simply randomize between the public good 2 and 3 and
this is the same as the example 1’s two player grand coalition case where there
are only two players. So as we have calculated in example 1, for a very high d or
for a very low d, 3 will want to compete against the coalition {1, 2}. That is, for
a sufficiently high a2 and for a range of d < d < d¯, 3 will want to build coalition
with 2 and therefore prefer pi2 over pi3.
How about for organization 2?
Proposition B.10 If pi2 and pi3 are nash equilibrium outcomes, for all b < 1 and a2 < 1,
2 will prefer pi3 over pi2.
When 2 is in the coalition {2, 3}, with 1/2 probability public good 2 will be pro-
vided and with 1/2 probability public good 3 will be provided. Since the cost
incurred would be −c, 2’s payoff will be 1/2 + 1/2d − c. When in the coalition
{1, 2} and competing against 3, the maximum payoff organization 2 can obtain
is 1/2 + 1/2d − c when b = 1 and a2 = 1. For all b < 1 and a2 < 1 then, it will be
better off being in the coalition {2, 3} than {1, 2}.
In sum, despite 2’s closeness to 1 in policy position, 2 will prefer to build
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coalition with 3 rather than 1 because 3 has a greater political opportunity than
1 which compensates for the differences in the claims. Therefore a coalition of 2
and 3 will arise rather than a coalition of 1 and 2 if and only if a2 is comparable
to a3 and the overlap between 2 and 3 is within a certain range.
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
C.1 Derivations of Results in Table 3.2
C.1.1 Case 1
0 < z <
wˆl
2
<
wh
2
< wˆl <
wh + wˆl
2
In this case, wˆl and wˆh are sufficiently high relative to z that only the households
with both individuals unemployed are poor. The value of Pα in this case is
Pα = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2(
z − 0
z
)α
= (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2. (C.1)
Let us now see how Pα is affected by an increase in wˆl. We have
dPα
dwˆl
= 2(1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )(−
1
2 − xh )
dxl
dwˆl
. (C.2)
For a standard labor demand function with
dxl
dwˆl
< 0, this expression is always
positive. That is, poverty always increases as the minimum wage increases.
Furthermore, if we assume a constant elasticity of labor demand η = −wˆl
xl
dxl
dwˆl
>
0, it can be manipulated to produce
wˆl
xl
dPα
dwˆl
= 2(1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )(−
1
2 − xh )
dxl
dwˆl
wˆl
xl
= 2(1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )(
1
2 − xh )η, (C.3)
where it is apparent that
dPα
dwˆl
> 0 if and only if η > 0 for all α.
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C.1.2 Case 2
0 <
wˆl
2
< z <
wh
2
< wˆl <
wh + wˆl
2
In Case 2, the poor households are those where both individuals are unem-
ployed or where only one household member is employed and that person
earns the minimum wage. In this case,
Pα = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 + 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α. (C.4)
The effect of a higher minimum wage is
dPα
dwˆl
= 2(1 − xh)( 12 − xh )[(1 −
xl
2 − xh )(−1 + (1 −
wˆl
2z
)α)
− ( xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α]
dxl
dwˆl
+ 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )α(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α−1(− 1
2z
). (C.5)
If we assume a constant elasticity of labor demand as before:
wˆl
xl
dPα
dwˆl
= 2(1 − xh)( 12 − xh )[(1 −
xl
2 − xh )(−1 + (1 −
wˆl
2z
)α)
− ( xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α]
wˆl
xl
dxl
dwˆl
+ 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )α(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α−1(− 1
2z
)
wˆl
xl
, (C.6)
which can be manipulated to yield
dPα
dwˆl
= 2(1 − xh)( 12 − xh )[(1 −
xl
2 − xh )(1 − (1 −
wˆl
2z
)α)
+ (
xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α]η(
wˆl
xl
)−1
+ 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )α(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α−1(− 1
2z
). (C.7)
The first term of (C.7) can be thought of as the unemployment effect; it tells
us how an increase in the minimum wage brings about a reduction in employ-
ment. The expression in brackets in the first term [(1 − xl
2 − xh )(1 − (1 −
wˆl
2z
)α) +
122
(
xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α] is always positive since 0 ≤ (1 − (1 − wˆl
2z
)α) ≤ 1 for all α. This
term is multiplied by a number of positive terms, which proves that the entire
first expression is always positive. The second term can be thought of as the
earnings effect; it tells us how an increase in the minimum wage affects Pα via
the gain in earnings for those employed. To sign this expression, note that in
Case 2,
wˆl
2
< z, hence 1 − wˆl
2z
> 0, and therefore all terms are positive except for
− 1
2z
. The product of these terms is therefore negative.
To analyze the sign of
dPα
dwˆl
let us deal now with some particular values of
α. First, it may be shown that when α = 0, for any η,
dPα
dwˆl
> 0. Then the
expression becomes
dP0
dwˆl
= 2(1 − xh)( 12 − xh )(
xl
2 − xh )η(
wˆl
xl
)−1, which is positive for
any positive η. It may also be shown that when α ≥ 1, dPα
dwˆl
≥ (<)0 if and only if
η > (<)
(1 − xl
2 − xh )α(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α−1(
1
2z
)wˆl
[(1 − xl
2 − xh ) + (
2xl
2 − xh − 1)(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α]
.
C.1.3 Case 3
0 <
wˆl
2
<
wh
2
< z 6 wˆl <
wh + wˆl
2
In this case, the poverty group consists of households in which both individuals
are unemployed and those in which only one household member is employed
regardless of the sector of employment. The extent of poverty in this case is
given by
Pα = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 + 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α
+ xh(1 − xl2 − xh )(1 −
wh
2z
)α. (C.8)
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Differentiating this with respect to the level of the minimum wage yields
dPα
dwl
= 2(1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )(−
1
2 − xh )
dxl
dwˆl
+ 2(1 − xh)( 12 − xh )
dxl
dwˆl
(1 − xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α
+ 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(−
1
2 − xh )
dxl
dwˆl
(1 − wˆl
2z
)α
+ 2(1 − xh( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )α(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α−1(− 1
2z
)
+ (− 1
2 − xh )xh
dxl
dwl
(1 − wh
2z
)α. (C.9)
If the labor demand elasticity η is assumed to be constant, equation (8) can be
further manipulated to yield a condition in terms of η:
wˆl
xl
dPα
dwl
= 2(1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )(−
1
2 − xh )
wˆl
xl
dxl
dwˆl
+ 2(1 − xh)( 12 − xh )
wˆl
xl
dxl
dwˆl
(1 − xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α
+ 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(−
1
2 − xh )
dxl
dwˆl
wˆl
xl
(1 − wˆl
2z
)α
+ 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )α(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α−1(− 1
2z
)
wˆl
xl
+ (− 1
2 − xh )xh
dxl
dwl
(1 − wh
2z
)α
wˆl
xl
, (C.10)
which in turn produces
dPα
dwl
= η[2(1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )(
1
2 − xh ) − 2(1 − xh)(
1
2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α
+ 2(1 − xh)( 12 − xh )(
xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α
+ (
1
2 − xh )xh(1 −
wh
2z
)α](
wˆl
xl
)−1
+ 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )α(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α−1(− 1
2z
). (C.11)
Again, the first term is the unemployment effect (which is always positive), and
the second term is the earnings effect (which is always negative). Let us look
at particular values of α. It can be verified that when α = 0, for any η,
dPα
dwl
>
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0. When α ≥ 1, dPα
dwl
≥ (<)0 if and only if η ≥ (<)[(1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )α(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α−1(
wˆl
z
)][2(1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh ) − 2(1 − xh)(1 −
2xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α + xh(1 − wh2z )
α]−1.
C.1.4 Case 4
0 <
wˆl
2
<
wh
2
< wˆl < z 6
wh + wˆl
2
In Case 4, households in which both individuals are unemployed and in which
only one household member is employed are below the poverty line. Moreover,
if both household members are employed and earn the minimum wage, that
household falls below the poverty line.
On the other hand, a household with a high wage earner and a low wage
earner is above the poverty line. This could be a possible stylization of the US
labor market where about 80% of minimum wage earners live with a high wage
earner (Burkhauser et al., 2000). The poverty measure in this case becomes:
Pα = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 + 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α
+ xh(1 − xl2 − xh )(1 −
wh
2z
)α + (1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )
2(1 − wˆl
z
)α. (C.12)
Differentiating the above expression with respect to wl to get the effect on Pα of
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increase in wl,
dPα
dwl
= 2(1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )(−
1
2 − xh )
dxl
dwˆl
+ 2(1 − xh)( 12 − xh )
dxl
dwˆl
(1 − xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α
+ 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(−
1
2 − xh )
dxl
dwˆl
(1 − wˆl
2z
)α
+ 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )α(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α−1(− 1
2z
)
+ (− 1
2 − xh )xh
dxl
dwl
(1 − wh
2z
)α
+ 2(1 − xh) xl2 − xh (
1
2 − xh )
dxl
dwl
(1 − wˆl
z
)α
+ (1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )
2α(1 − wˆl
z
)α−1(−1
z
). (C.13)
If the labor demand elasticity η is assumed to be constant, it can be rewritten as:
wˆl
xl
dPα
dwl
= 2(1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )(−
1
2 − xh )
wˆl
xl
dxl
dwˆl
+ 2(1 − xh)( 12 − xh )
wˆl
xl
dxl
dwˆl
(1 − xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α
+ 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(−
1
2 − xh )
dxl
dwˆl
wˆl
xl
(1 − wˆl
2z
)α
+ 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )α(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α−1(− 1
2z
)
wˆl
xl
+ (− 1
2 − xh )xh
dxl
dwl
(1 − wh
2z
)α
wˆl
xl
+ 2(1 − xh) xl2 − xh (
1
2 − xh )
dxl
dwl
(1 − wˆl
z
)α
wˆl
xl
+ (1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )
2α(1 − wˆl
z
)α−1(−1
z
)
wˆl
xl
, (C.14)
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which can be expressed as:
dPα
dwl
= η[2(1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )(
1
2 − xh ) − 2(1 − xh)(
1
2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α
+ 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(
1
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α + (
1
2 − xh )xh(1 −
wh
2z
)α
− 2(1 − xh) xl2 − xh (
1
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
z
)α](
wˆl
xl
)−1
+ 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )α(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α−1(− 1
2z
)
+ (1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )
2α(1 − wˆl
z
)α−1(−1
z
). (C.15)
Again, the first term on the right hand side is the unemployment effect. which
can be shown to be always positive. (Group the first two terms in brackets
together and the third and fifth terms together, from which we can see that the
bracketed term is always positive.) The rest of the terms of the equation form
the earnings effect, which is always negative. Looking at different values of α,
when α = 0 , for any η,
dPα
dwl
> 0. When α ≥ 1, it may be shown that dPα
dwl
≥ (<)0
if and only if η ≥ (<)[(1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )α(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α−1(
wˆl
z
) + (1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )α(1 −
wˆl
z
)α−1(
wˆl
z
)][2(1− xh)(1− xl2 − xh )− 2(1− xh)(1−
2xl
2 − xh )(1−
wˆl
2z
)α + xh(1− wh2z )
α − 2(1−
xh)
xl
2 − xh (1 −
wˆl
z
)α]−1.
C.1.5 Case 5
0 <
wˆl
2
<
wh
2
< wˆl <
wh + wˆl
2
< z
For Case 5, all households fall below the poverty line regardless of the employ-
ment status of the household members. The poverty measure can be expressed
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in this case as:
Pα = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 + 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α
+ xh(1 − xl2 − xh )(1 −
wh
2z
)α + (1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )
2(1 − wˆl
z
)α
+ xh
xl
2 − xh (1 −
wˆl + wh
2z
)α. (C.16)
Differentiating this expression with respect to wˆl yields
dPα
dwl
= 2(1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )(−
1
2 − xh )
dxl
dwˆl
+ 2(1 − xh)( 12 − xh )
dxl
dwˆl
(1 − xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α
+ 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(−
1
2 − xh )
dxl
dwˆl
(1 − wˆl
2z
)α
+ 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )α(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α−1(− 1
2z
)
+ (− 1
2 − xh )xh
dxl
dwl
(1 − wh
2z
)α
+ 2(1 − xh) xl2 − xh (
1
2 − xh )
dxl
dwl
(1 − wˆl
z
)α
+ (1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )
2α(1 − wˆl
z
)α−1(−1
z
)
+ xh
1
2 − xh
dxl
dwl
(1 − wˆl + wh
2z
)α
+ xh
xl
2 − xhα(1 −
wˆl + wh
2z
)α−1(− 1
2z
). (C.17)
If the elasticity of labor demand is assumed constant, the previous expression
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can be rewritten as:
wˆl
xl
dPα
dwl
= 2(1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )(−
1
2 − xh )
wˆl
xl
dxl
dwˆl
+ 2(1 − xh)( 12 − xh )
wˆl
xl
dxl
dwˆl
(1 − xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α
+ 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(−
1
2 − xh )
dxl
dwˆl
wˆl
xl
(1 − wˆl
2z
)α
+ 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )α(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α−1(− 1
2z
)
wˆl
xl
+ (− 1
2 − xh )xh
dxl
dwl
(1 − wh
2z
)α
wˆl
xl
+ 2(1 − xh) xl2 − xh (
1
2 − xh )
dxl
dwl
(1 − wˆl
z
)α
wˆl
xl
+ (1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )
2α(1 − wˆl
z
)α−1(−1
z
)
wˆl
xl
+ xh
1
2 − xh
dxl
dwl
wˆl
xl
(1 − wˆl + wh
2z
)α
+ xh
xl
2 − xhα(1 −
wˆl + wh
2z
)α−1(− 1
2z
)
wˆl
xl
, (C.18)
which in turn can be rewritten as
dPα
dwl
= η[2(1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )(
1
2 − xh ) − 2(1 − xh)(
1
2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α
+ 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(
1
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α
− 2(1 − xh) xl2 − xh (
1
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
z
)α
+ (
1
2 − xh )xh(1 −
wh
2z
)α − xh 12 − xh (1 −
wˆl + wh
2z
)α(
wˆl
xl
)−1
+ 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )α(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α−1(− 1
2z
)
+ (1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )
2α(1 − wˆl
z
)α−1(−1
z
)
+ xh
xl
2 − xhα(1 −
wˆl + wh
2z
)α−1(− 1
2z
). (C.19)
Again, we have the unemployment effect (always positive) in the first term of
the right hand side of the equation and the earnings effect (always negative) in
the rest of the equation. Analyzing this for specific values of α, when α = 0, for
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any η,
dPα
dwl
= 0. This is because everyone is under the poverty line, and that does
not change as wˆl increases. When α = 1, it is straightforward to show that for
η ≥ (<)1, dPα
dwl
≥ (<)0. Finally, for α > 1, we have the condition that: dPα
dwl
≥ (<)0
if and only if η ≥ (<)[(1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )α(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α−1(
wˆl
z
) + (1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )α(1 −
wˆl
z
)α−1(
wˆl
z
) + xhα(1− wˆl + wh2z )
α−1(
wˆl
2z
)][2(1− xh)(1− xl2 − xh )− 2(1− xh)(1−
2xl
2 − xh )(1−
wˆl
2z
)α + xh(1 − wh2z )
α − 2(1 − xh) xl2 − xh (1 −
wˆl
z
)α − xh(1 − wˆl + wh2z )
α]−1.
C.2 Proofs for Propositions
C.2.1 Proposition 3.1
a) From (C.7),
dPα
dwˆl
> 0 within Case 2.
b) From (C.2),
dPα
dwˆl
> 0 within Case 1.
c) The boundary between Cases 2 and 1 occurs at wˆl = 2z. From (C.4),
Pα = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 + 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α in Case 2; from
(C.1), Pα = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 in Case 1.
Evaluated at wˆl = 2z and setting α = 0,
P0 = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 + 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh ) (C.20)
in Case 2 and
P0 = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 (C.21)
in Case 1. Because (C.20) > (C.21), P0 falls discontinuously at wˆl = 2z. Combin-
ing results a-c), Proposition 3.1 is proved.
130
C.2.2 Proposition 3.2
a) From (C.19),
dPα
dwˆl
= 0 within Case 5.
b) From (C.15),
dPα
dwˆl
> 0 within Case 4.
c) From (C.11),
dPα
dwˆl
> 0 within Case 3.
d) The boundary between Cases 5 and 4 occurs at wˆl = 2z − wˆh From (C.16),
Pα = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 + 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α
+ xh(1 − xl2 − xh )(1 −
wh
2z
)α + (1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )
2(1 − wˆl
z
)α
+ xh
xl
2 − xh (1 −
wˆl + wh
2z
)α (C.22)
in Case 5; from (C.12),
Pα = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 + 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α
+ xh(1 − xl2 − xh )(1 −
wh
2z
)α + (1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )
2(1 − wˆl
z
)α (C.23)
in Case 4. Evaluated at wˆl = 2z − wˆh and setting α = 0,
P0 = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 + 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh ) + xh(1 −
xl
2 − xh )
+ (1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )
2 + xh
xl
2 − xh (C.24)
in Case 5 and
P0 = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 + 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh ) + xh(1 −
xl
2 − xh )
+ (1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )
2 (C.25)
in Case 4. Because (C.24) > (C.15), P0 falls discontinuously at wˆl = 2z − wˆh.
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e) The boundary between Cases 4 and 3 occurs at wˆl = z. From (C.12),
Pα = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 + 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α
+ xh(1 − xl2 − xh )(1 −
wh
2z
)α + (1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )
2(1 − wˆl
z
)α (C.26)
in Case 4. From (C.8),
Pα = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 + 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α
+ xh(1 − xl2 − xh )(1 −
wh
2z
)α (C.27)
in Case 3.
Evaluated at wˆl = z and setting α = 0,
P0 = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 + 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh ) + xh(1 −
xl
2 − xh )
+ (1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )
2 (C.28)
in Case 4 and
P0 = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 + 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh ) + xh(1 −
xl
2 − xh ) (C.29)
in Case 3. Because (C.28) > (C.29), P0 falls discontinuously at wˆl = 2z − wˆh.
Combining results a-e), Proposition 3.2 is proved.
C.2.3 Proposition 3.3
Proof for z <
wh
2
:
The continuity of P2 within each case is evident. As for the boundary, the
dividing line between Cases 2 and 1 occurs at wˆl = 2z. From (C.4),
P2 = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 + 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α (C.30)
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in Case 2; from (C.1),
P2 = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 (C.31)
in Case 1. Evaluated at wˆl = 2z, P2 = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 in Case 2, which is
identical to what P2 equals in Case 1 at that point. Continuity is thereby proved.
C.2.4 Proposition 3.4
Proof for z >
wh
2
:
a-c) The continuity of P2 within each case follows exactly as in C.2 a-c).
d) The boundary between Cases 5 and 4 occurs at wˆl = 2z − wˆh. From (C.16),
Pα = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 + 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α
+ xh(1 − xl2 − xh )(1 −
wh
2z
)α + (1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )
2(1 − wˆl
z
)α
+ xh
xl
2 − xh (1 −
wˆl + wh
2z
)α (C.32)
in Case 5; From (C.12),
Pα = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 + 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z)α + xh(1 − xl2 − xh )(1 −
wh
2z
)α + (1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )
2(1 − wˆl
z
)α (C.33)
in Case 4.
Evaluated at wˆl = 2z − wˆh and setting α = 2,
P2 = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 + 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )(1 −
2z − wh
2z
)2
+ xh(1 − xl2 − xh )(1 −
wh
2z
)2 + (1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )
2(1 − 2z − wh
z
)2 (C.34)
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in Case 5 and
P2 = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 + 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )(1 −
2z − wh
2z
)2
+ xh(1 − xl2 − xh )(1 −
wh
2z
)2 + (1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )
2(1 − 2z − wh
z
)2 (C.35)
in Case 4. These are identical, and therefore P2 is continuous at the boundary
between Cases 5 and 4.
e) The boundary between Cases 4 and 3 occurs at wˆl = z. From (C.12),
Pα = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 + 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α
+ xh(1 − xl2 − xh )(1 −
wh
2z
)α + (1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )
2(1 − wˆl
z
)α (C.36)
in Case 4; from (C.8),
Pα = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 + 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )(1 −
wˆl
2z
)α
+ xh(1 − xl2 − xh )(1 −
wh
2z
)α (C.37)
in Case 3.
Evaluated at wˆl = z and setting α = 2,
P2 = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 + 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )(
1
2
)2 + xh(1 − xl2 − xh )(1 −
wh
2z
)2
(C.38)
Case 4 and
P2 = (1 − xh)(1 − xl2 − xh )
2 + 2(1 − xh)( xl2 − xh )(1 −
xl
2 − xh )(
1
2
)2 + xh(1 − xl2 − xh )(1 −
wh
2z
)2
(C.39)
in Case 3. These are identical, and therefore P2 is continuous at the boundary
between Cases 4 and 3. Combining results a-e), Proposition 3.4 is proved.
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